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ABSTRACT 
 
 
On October 4th 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first man-made satellite, 
Sputnik 1, into an elliptical low Earth orbit. This surprise triggered an arms race between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as science-oriented educational reform in 
the U.S. Sputnik sparked changes for the U.S. in military, politics, policies, and 
education. The launch of Sputnik woke Americans up from complacency came from 
technology, science, and educational superiority. Educational reform started with 
emphasizing science and defense education and it was expanded to all levels of 
education. Early reforms, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National 
Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 were focused on science and defense education 
during Eisenhower’s administration. Domestic programs such as Civil Rights and Great 
Society diffused educational policy to produce more general human capitals for improve 
poverty and economic growth during the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson. The 
Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 was enacted to support postsecondary education. I 
assert that these policy outputs have contributed to the dramatic increase in the supply of 
college graduates since 1960. This study begins with emphasizing the Soviet launching of 
Sputnik and educational reform in early 1960s in U.S. as a cause and effect relationship. 
Analysis focuses on the policy process of educational reform by applying Kingdon’s 
multiple streams model, and on the economic effects of increase in the supply of college 
graduates by applying Acemoglu’s theory, the pooling and separating equilibria (1999). 
According to Acemoglu, economy transitions from initial pooling equilibrium to 
separating equilibrium as supply of high skilled labor increases and thus labor markets 
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show different patterns in unemployment rates and wage structures for skilled and 
unskilled, as well as job mismatch. I find that occupational segregation at the state labor 
markets increases corresponding to supply of college graduates, and overeducation 
decreases as occupational segregation increases. Moreover, occupational segregation has 
positive wage effects and wage penalty from overeducation becomes smaller in states 
where occupations are more separated between the skilled and the unskilled. College 
graduates earn more wage premiums in states where occupations are more separated 
between the skilled and the unskilled. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
           This paper analyzes educational reform in the early 1960s in the United States, and 
its economic consequences. This paper is consisted of two parts: the first part analyzes 
policy process of educational reform in early 1960s in the U.S., and the second part 
analyzes its economic consequences over time from 1960 to 2000. Instead of focusing on 
a single specific policy, I focus on a policy event, which is the educational reform. 
Sometimes reform movements in a society arise domestically, but sometimes they 
happens by exogenous event. My observation is that the education reform in the early 
1960s in America did not arise domestically but was triggered by an exogenous event, 
which was the Soviet launch of Sputnik, on October 4, 1957. Therefore, I treat the launch 
of Sputnik as a cause of the policy event. 
            According to the National Aeronautics and Space Act (NASA), Sputnik was the 
world’s first artificial satellite and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its 
elliptical path1. I begin this paper with the claim that there is a cause and effect 
relationship between the Soviet launching of Sputnik and educational reform in the 
United States. My observation is that there were immediate responses from the American 
government such as: (1) U.S. Congress increased the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
appropriation to $136 million for the 12 months beginning July 1, 1958 for existing NSF 
educational programs and for the initiation of new ones. In 1960, the NSF’s appropriation 
                                                 
1 http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ 
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was $152.7 million and 2000 grants were made. (2) President Eisenhower signed the 
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) into law in September 1958. The NDEA 
poured $887 million over four years into programs intended to develop talented people in 
America in fields related to national defense, and in 1965, Congress passed the Higher 
Education Act (HEA) to assist postsecondary education.               
            The reason why I claim that Sputnik triggered educational reform in America 
rather than other countries is that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and America 
(two superpowers) were in an arms race in developing the Inter Continental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM), nuclear weapons, and so on. Moreover, in 1955, America also had 
established a project to launch its own satellite, which was called Vanguard. The Project 
Vanguard was a program managed by the United States Naval Research Laboratory 
(NRL), which intended to launch the first artificial satellite into Earth orbit using a 
Vanguard rocket as the launch vehicle. Therefore, the two superpowers were not only in 
arms race in missiles and nuclear weapons, but also in launching satellites, a competition 
known as the space race2. In this competitive mood, the Soviet launch of Sputnik 1 
brought a sudden change in the image of America, which had previously believed itself to 
be the superior in education, science, technology, and military power in the world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It is called the space race to distinguish from a formal arms race because its domain is the exterior of the 
earth. In this paper, however, I consider the space race as an arms race in satellites such as arms race in 
missiles or arms race in nuclear weapons, rather than separating space race from arms race as a different 
concept. 
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Figure 1. Wonder Why We are Not Keeping Pace?3
 
            The American government perceived the Sputnik as more of a military threat to 
national security than a simple product of science and technology. Although the average 
Americans did not know much about any possible uses of a satellite, scientists, 
politicians, and military personnel well knew about the potentiality of satellite 
technology. Therefore, the American government could not consider the Sputnik as a 
simple science and technology competition. Unfortunately, however, President 
Eisenhower found that America was far behind the Soviet Union in basic science and in a 
shortfall of scientists, especially space engineers. To have a space race with the Soviet 
Union, America needed immense human capital in the science and space engineering 
fields as soon as possible. Therefore, President Eisenhower, Congress, and the American 
public began to recognize the need for educational investments in the U.S.  
                                                 
3 Source: Herblock, The Washington Post 
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            The second part of this paper is about the economic analysis of consequences of 
educational reform. I observe that, since 1960, there has been an increase in college 
enrollments. In 1940, less than one American adult in twenty (4.6 percent) was a college 
graduate, but the number had quadrupled to one in five (19.4percent) in 1986 (Orfield, 
1990). College enrollment was up 45 percent between 1970 and 1983 (Orfield, 1990). In 
the beginning of the educational reform, the purpose of the NSF was educating science 
elites. The purpose of the NDEA (1958) became a little bit broader focusing on science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics. Later, HEA (1965) was purposed to provide 
financial support for general postsecondary education, and was reauthorized many times 
up to 2013. Although NSF and NDEA (1958) produced science-related human capitals 
intensively, with the perspective of higher education policy, I observe that sequential 
education related policies have contributed to an increase in the supply of college 
graduates in the labor market. Therefore, I argue that the consequences of the continuous 
educational reforms is an increase in the supply of college graduates in the U.S. labor 
market. 
             Some scholars argue that the wage rate of college graduates relative to the high 
school graduates, called college wage premium, has been decreased due to an oversupply 
of college graduates. For example, Freeman (1975) was the first observant of wage 
depression for college graduates. He observed deterioration of economic position of 
college graduates between 1969 and 1973, and claimed that there was over investments in 
college education in the United States.  
 5 
             Autor et al. (1998), however, found that widespread skill-biased technological 
changes (SBTC) in the 1980s brought a huge demand for highly educated workers, as 
well as a change in wage structure. He used usage of a computer as a proxy measurement 
of SBTC and asserted that computer-led industrialization increased demands for skilled 
labor and highly educated workers. Therefore, he claimed that over time, relative wages 
of college graduates to high school graduates has been increased. 
             Acemoglu (1999) uses pooling and separating equilibria to explain wage 
inequality in 1980s U.S. According to him, when skilled workers are few in the labor 
market and productivity gap is small between skilled and unskilled, firms create middling 
jobs for both skilled and unskilled workers because creating jobs separately for skilled 
and unskilled is not profitable. When skilled workers are abundant in the labor market, 
firms create jobs separately for the skilled and the unskilled. By this theory, the economy 
transforms from the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium. In separating 
equilibrium, wages for skilled workers are much higher but wages for unskilled workers 
are much lower than in the pooling equilibrium. Unemployment rates become higher for 
both the skilled and the unskilled because firms increase job screening to find better 
matched workers, but job mismatch becomes lower.  
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Table 1. Years of Overeducation and Incidence of Mismatch 
 
 
Years of Overeducation for Total Incidence of Mismatch for College Graduates (%) 
 Mean Variance Obs. Required Over Under Obs. 
1960 0.58 1.36 166301 30.40 62.27 7.33 10056 
1970 0.53 1.30 182258 27.86 68.67 3.47 11552 
1980 0.78 1.47 1067092 28.43 68.33 3.24 116681 
1990 0.62 1.18 1370669 54.04 42.94 3.02 216396 
2000 0.59 1.13 1583545 62.68 34.66 2.66 288056 
 
  
             Table 1 shows years of overeducation for the total sample and the incidence of 
mismatch for college graduates, respectively.4 Years of overeducation is measured based 
on the Duncan-Hoffman mismatch measurement, which is actual education minus mode 
years of education in each occupation.5 Years of overeducation measures how many 
years of education are surplus over the education that the occupation requires. The left 
hand side of the table reveals that, since 1980, the mean value of years of overeducation 
has decreased and variance has been smaller. The right hand side of the table is made 
based on mismatch dummy variables. For example, required education is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the worker’s educational attainment is equal to the mode year of 
education in each occupation. Overeducation is equal to 1 if his or her education is more 
than mode year of education, and undereducation is equal to 1 if his or her education is 
                                                 
4 Generally, economic concern of job mismatch is on overeducation because overeducated workers earn less 
than their marginal product, and overeducation is the challenge for mainly college graduates than high school 
graduates. 
5 Methodology is explained in the literature review.  
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less than mode year of education. It shows that, since 1970, the percentage of college 
graduates categorized to required education has been increased, and overeducation has 
been decreased.  
            In this paper, I examine the economic effects of the increase in supply of college 
graduates by applying Acemoglu’s theory, the pooling and separating equilibria, in three 
aspects: wage effects of industry-occupational segregation, job mismatch, and college 
wage premium. I differentiate this paper from previous literatures in two ways. First, with 
applying Acemoglu’s theory, I focus on the event of educational reform in America and 
thereby I link educational reform and increase in the supply of college graduates. 
Therefore, in this paper, supply of college graduates is not an exogenous variable. 
Second, with regard to job mismatch, previous literature has not considered the transition 
of the economy. Applying Acemoglu’s theory, I measure wage effects of mismatch in the 
relation with transition of economy from the pooling equilibrium to the separating 
equilibrium. In other words, the magnitudes of wage penalty related with overeducation 
may be different in the pooling equilibrium and in the separating equilibrium as wages 
for skilled worker are expected to be different from different equilibria. 
           The outline of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous literature about 
changes in wage structure in America and job mismatch. In Chapter 3, I propose three 
arms race models to explain the relationship between Sputnik and educational reform. By 
applying Kingdon’s multiple streams I try to understand the policy process of policy 
outputs in the beginning of the educational reform. In Chapter 4, I review the government 
financial aid for education with different views. In Chapter 5, I describe policy outputs 
 8 
such as National Science Foundation (NSF), National Defense Educational Act of 1958, 
and Higher Education Act of 1965, and trend of college enrollments as policy effects. 
Chapter 6 reports results of the empirical study, and summary and conclusion remarks are 
in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
            1. Change in Wage Structure 
 
            Slonimczyk (2013) shows that skill mismatch was a significant source of 
inequality in real earnings in the U.S. during 1973-2002. He uses the Duncan-Hoffman 
mismatch measure. His inequality measurements are the variance of log earnings, the 
Gini coefficient, and percentile gaps of earnings by using General Education 
Development (GED), Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to measure required 
education, and using data from CPS 1973 to 2002. Over-education rates for males and 
females were around 15% in 1973 and increasing constantly throughout the period to 
reach levels of around 35% of the employed labor force, while under-education follows a 
downward trend. Surplus and deficit qualifications taken together account for 4.3% and 
4.6% of the variance of log earnings (around 15% of the total explained variance in 2002) 
for males and females, respectively. 
            Katz and Murphy (1992) investigated changes in relative wages from 1963 to 
1987 by using a supply and demand framework. They were concerned with explaining 
relative wage changes as a function of relative supply and relative factor demand shifts. 
They found that changes in the wage structure were derived from a growth in the demand 
for high educated and more skilled workers, and the college premium was strongly 
related with supply of college graduates using data from March CPS, 1964 to 1988.  
 10 
Figure 2. College/High School Wage Ratio
 
Figure 2 comes from their paper6, which shows that the college wage premium for those 
who have 1-5 years of experience and all experience levels, respectively. The wage ratio 
rose from 1963 to 1971, fell from 1971 to 1979, and then rose sharply from 1979 to 1987, 
consistent with the largest increase in the supply of college graduates during the 1971 to 
1979, and the smallest growth of supply during the 1979 to 1987. Moreover, they found 
that the changes in the college/high school wage ratio were greatest for the youngest 
workers in the 1970s and 1980s and greatest for prime age workers in the 1960s.  
            Acemoglu (1999) explains wage inequality in 1980’s U.S. by qualitative change 
in the composition of jobs, which was derived from the increase in the proportion of 
skilled workers or skill-biased technological change (SBTC). He observed wage 
differentials between college graduates and high school graduates, and among college 
graduates themselves in 1980s. He claims that increase in the supply of skills can create 
                                                 
6 Katz, F. Lawrence, Kevin M. Murphy, “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand 
Factors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 1. (Feb., 1992), pp. 35-78. 
All experience 
levels 
1-5 years of experience 
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more than its own demand and increase inequality. He provides a theory for wage 
differentials between different skill groups and within skill groups by using job mismatch 
and transition of labor market equilibrium, in which economy has a pooling equilibrium 
and a separating equilibrium.  
            According to Acemoglu, in a pooling equilibrium, profit-maximizing firms create 
middling jobs for both skilled and unskilled workers when the supply of skills is limited 
and the productivity gap is small between skilled and unskilled workers. Because in a 
pooling equilibrium both skilled and unskilled workers are employed in the same jobs, 
unskilled workers are employed at higher physical to human capital ratios than the skilled 
workers, and thus wage differentials are compressed. In a separating equilibrium, firms 
create separate jobs for skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, in a separating 
equilibrium, skilled workers earn more and the unskilled earn less than in a pooling 
equilibrium. His theory says that labor market transits from a pooling equilibrium to a 
separating equilibrium as the supply of skilled workers increases or skilled-biased 
technological change increases the demand for skilled workers. As a result, qualitative 
change in the composition of jobs reduces unskilled wages, raises skilled wages and 
raises unemployment rates for both groups. He provides some evidence for a shifting of 
labor market from a pooling to a separating equilibrium between 1970s and the 1990s by 
using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976, 1978, and 1985) and Current Population 
Survey (ORG 1983, 1993).  
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            2. Theory about Existence of Overeducation 
 
            Typically, job mismatch is defined as educational mismatch between educational 
attainment an occupation requires to do the work and educational attainment that workers 
acquired. There are several theoretical explanations about the existence of overeducation 
in the labor market. 
            According to Spence’s (1973) job-screening model, the labor market is 
characterized by imperfect information, and  education  is  used  as  a  signal  to  identify  
more able  and  motivated  individuals  or  more  productive ones  to  employers. In the 
job-screening model, education does not relate directly to productivity, while human 
capital theory says that education improves productivity and impacts returns to schooling. 
In order to acquire more of the signal, individuals  will  invest  more  in  education, 
hoping  that  an  additional  amount  of  educational signal  suffices  to  distinguish  them  
from  others.  Therefore, there is a tendency to get more years of education than is 
required for jobs. The private rate of return from educational investment  can  stay  high  
and  provide  continuing incentives  for  investment  in  education. 
            The job-competition model of Thurow (1975) considers two queues: a job queue 
and a person queue. Each job in the job queue has its own skill requirements, productivity 
characteristics and pay scale. Individuals competing for jobs also form a queue, their 
relative position in the queue being determined by a set of characteristics such as 
education and experience that suggest to employers the cost of training them in the skills 
necessary to perform a given job. The higher a person is in the person queue, the less is 
the cost of training and the more likely the person will be to get a job at the head of the 
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job queue. Thus, in order to place themselves higher up in the person queue, individuals 
will invest in education hoping that an additional amount of education will enhance their 
chance of getting a good job relative to others. Therefore, wages are determined by 
demand side. Education is heavily subsidized by the government so that the private cost 
of education is reduced. Individuals would be expected to consider only their private 
costs instead of the true social costs in making decisions regarding educational 
investment. According to the job screening theory and job competition theory, 
overeducation is rather a persistent phenomenon. 
 
            3. Overeducation: permanent or transitory? 
 
            There has been an argument whether overeducation is a transitory phenomenon in 
one’s job career or a persistent phenomenon. Jovanovic (1979) constructed a model of 
permanent job separations, in which a job match is treated as a pure experience good. In 
his theory, workers find a better match as their experiences in the labor market grows. 
Therefore, inexperienced or young workers are more likely to be in a mismatch. 
According to Jovanovic, overeducation is a short-run phenomenon.  
            Sicherman and Galor (1990) analyzed the significance of occupational mobility in 
individuals’ labor market career and explain the part of returns to schooling by 
occupational upgrading. They used data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
1976-81. Schooling has a positive effect on career mobility within and across firms. More 
educated workers are more likely to quit than to be laid off.  
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            Hersch (1991) analyzed the relationship between overeducation and job 
satisfaction. He found that overqualified workers are less satisfied with their jobs and are 
more likely to quit.  
            Sicherman Nachum (1991) examined the reasons for overeducation and returns to 
schooling in the human capital mobility framework. He hypothesized that a trade-off 
exists between schooling and other components of human capital. Mismatch is a 
temporary phenomenon in the career mobility theory. He used data from Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) 1976-77 and 1978-79. Around 40% of the workers report 
themselves as overeducated and 16% as undereducated. Overeducated workers have low 
mean years of market experience, while undereducated workers are much more 
experienced. Overeducated workers have less on-the-job training, while undereducated 
workers report more on-the-job training. Overeducated workers are more likely to change 
firms, while the undereducated stay much longer in the same firm. Overeducated workers 
are more likely to move to a higher-level occupation and undereducated workers have a 
lower probability of upward mobility.  
            Alba-Ramirez (1993) examined overeducation in the Spanish labor market. He 
found that overeducated workers have less experience, decreased on-the-job training and 
higher turnover than other comparable workers. He used data from The Living and 
Working Conditions Survey (ECVT), a Spanish nation-wide representative household 
survey of 1985. In the ECVT survey, 17% workers reported themselves as overeducated 
and 23% workers reported as undereducated. Overeducated workers earned more than the 
adequately educated, while undereducated workers earned less than adequately educated. 
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Unobserved heterogeneity and compensating differentials could be important. A logit 
estimation indicated that overeducated workers have a higher turnover rate. Male, more 
educated, as well as more experienced workers, have a higher probability of improving 
their match as they move from one job to another.  
             Sousa-Poza and Frei (2012) examined whether overqualification is permanent or 
transitory in Switzerland by using panel data from Swiss Household Panel for 1999 to 
2006. Constant accumulation of experience and qualifications throughout a worker’s 
career help escape from overqualification. While in early life overqualification rises and 
reaches its peak between 25 and 35 years of age, it declines in advancing years. They 
found that overqualification is short-lived for individuals. More than 60% of the workers 
who become overqualified in a given year escape overqualification the following year; 
about 80% have escaped overqualification after two years and close to 90% after four 
years. 
 
            4. Measurement of Required Education 
 
          There are three methods of measuring required education: objective measure (job 
analysis), subjective measure (self-assessment), and statistical measure (realized 
matches). First, job analysis measures required schooling levels based on information 
contained in occupational classifications. A well-known example is the Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles, which contains indicators for educational requirements in the form 
of the General Educational Development (GED) scale. This scale runs from 1 to 7. These 
GED categories are then translated into school years equivalents (0 to 18). Second, self-
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assessment measures are based on workers’ responses to rely on questions that ask 
workers about the schooling requirements of their job. In most survey data, respondents 
subjectively answer to the survey question whether they consider themselves to have the 
required educated or not for the job they are doing. Third, realized matches compare 
workers’ educational level in the occupation by using a statistical mean or modal value of 
the distribution. Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) defined required education as one standard 
deviation plus/minus mean value of education in each occupation. Kiker et al. (1997) 
uses mode value of years of education in each occupation for the required education.     
             
            5. Empirical Specifications for Mismatch  
 
            There are two popular empirical specifications used to assess the wage effect of 
overeducation. They are derived from the standard Mincer (1974) model, in which 
earnings are a function of schooling and experience as follows: 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒) =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
2 + 𝜀𝑖 
where Ln Wage represents log wages, and Education represents educational attainment. 
In this specification, it is assumed that workers are fully utilized and paid according to 
their marginal productivity. Therefore, there is no overeducation.  
            However, the following two models incorporate factor underutilization in the 
wage function. If workers are classified as overeducated, they are considered to not fully 
utilize their human capital in their job; the portion of extra years of education become 
idle and is not rewarded well. In other words, overeducated workers are paid below than 
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their marginal productivity, while workers are paid based on marginal productivity in 
neoclassical economics.  
            The first mismatch model is the Verdugo and Verdugo model (1989), 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒) =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖 
where Ln Wage represents log wages, Education represents years of schooling completed 
and Overeducation (Undereducation) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual is 
categorized as overeducated (undereducatied) category. In this model, mismatched 
workers are compared to workers with the same level of schooling who hold adequately 
matched jobs. If wages are determined by only actual educational attainment, beta 2 and 
beta 3 are expected to be zero. If wages are determined by the required level of education, 
years of schooling exceeding the required amount would be unproductive and the reward 
for these additional years would be zero. In this case, an overeducated worker would earn 
less than those who have the required education and beta 2 would be negative, while beta 
3 would be positive. Most studies have found that overeducated workers receive 
significant pay penalties (𝛽2<0) and undereducated workers receive substantial wage 
premiums (𝛽3>0) (Verdugo & Verdugo, 1989; Sicherman, 1991; Bauer, 2002).  
            The second mismatch model is the Duncan and Hoffman (1984) model that 
decomposes actual years of schooling (EDU) into required years of schooling (EDUr), 
years of overschooling (EDUo), and years of underschooling (EDUu). 
𝐿𝑛 (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒) =  𝛼1 +  𝛽1𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 +  𝛽2𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑜 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑢 +  𝜀𝑖 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 =  𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 +  𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑜 − 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑢 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑜 =  𝐸𝐷𝑈 −  𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐷𝑈 > 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0 
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𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑢 =  𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 −  𝐸𝐷𝑈 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐷𝑈 < 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑟 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0 
In this model, beta 1 is the return to years of required schooling (required education), beta 
2 is the return to an additional year of schooling beyond those required (overeducation), 
and beta 3 is the return to a year of schooling below the schooling requirement 
(undereducation). Most studies have found that the extra years of schooling have a 
positive wage effect but smaller than the return to years of required schooling (𝛽1 > 
𝛽2>0), while return to years of underschooling is negative (𝛽3<0). Compare to the 
Verdugo and Verdugo model, beta 1 and beta 2 must be interpreted relative to workers in 
the same occupation who are correctly matched. Human capital theory implies equal 
returns 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = −𝛽3. Job competition theory is a demand-side theory, where marginal 
productivity is taken as a fixed characteristic of a particular job and is not related to the 
worker. It implies zero returns to years of over and under education, 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 0 
(Duncan & Hoffman, 1981; Rumberger, 1987; Sicherman, 1991) 
 
             6. Job Mismatch and Productivity 
 
            Tsang and Levin (1985) questioned the relationship between overeducation and 
productivity. Based on industrial psychology literature, they claimed that overeducated 
workers are more likely to be dissatisfied with their jobs and exhibit counterproductive 
behavior in the workplace.  
            Tsang (1987) examined the impact of the underutilization of workers’ educational 
skills on the production of output of a firm based on the Tsang-Levin model of 
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production. He used the employees of 22 U.S. Bell companies over 1981 to 1983. His 
three-step approach showed a negative impact of overeducation on firm productivity.  
            Ramos et al., (2009) examined impacts of overeducation on the regional 
economic growth in 229 European regions in nine countries by using IPUMS 
International for 1995, 2000, 2005. They used both cross-sectional and panel regression. 
They found that both the percentage of properly educated workers and the percentage of 
over-educated workers have positive and statistically significant impacts on per capita 
GDP growth. Especially, the magnitude of the coefficient for the percentage of over-
educated workers is greater than the coefficient for the percentage of properly educated 
workers. The results reveal that at the regional level as an aggregation, overeducation 
might be seen more as an investment than as a cost, although overeducated individuals 
obtain a smaller wage than individuals who have required education. In other words, they 
insist that the economic impact of overeducation is different between the individual level 
and the aggregation level. 
 
            7. Quintile Regression 
 
            Hartog et al, (2001) examined the evolution of the returns to education in Portugal 
over the 1980s and early 1990s. Quintile regression analysis reveals that the effect of 
education is not constant across the conditional wage distribution. They are higher for 
those at higher quintiles in the conditional wage distribution. Education affects wages 
differently at different parts of the distribution. The return to a year of education required 
and the return to a year of education above the job requirement increase as one moves 
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upwards in the conditional wage distribution. The penalty for a year of education below 
that required for the job also tends to increase at higher quintiles, but at a much slower 
pace.  
            McGuinness and Doyle (2004) examined the impacts of overeducation on income 
quantiles for a cohort of Northern Ireland graduates. They used a dummy variable for 
overeducation and found that the related wage penalty was heavily concentrated on the 
lower income quintiles. Especially, overeducation was more predominant amongst lower 
ability male graduates.  
 
            8. Unobserved heterogeneity 
 
            The majority of studies have assumed that mismatch is exogenous and used cross-
sectional data that cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity. Robst (1995) examined 
the relationship between college quality and overeducation by using Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) data for 1976 and 1985. He found a negative relationship 
between college quality and the likelihood of being overeducated, and college quality 
influences the ability of overeducated workers to exit the classification. College quality is 
measured by ACT scores, SAT scores, the amount of education and general expenditure 
per student, and a prestige rating developed by Richard Coleman. Those with higher test 
scores face a lower likelihood of being overeducated. For the average ACT score, 44% of 
the lowest quartile were overeducated in both periods. Of the workers who were 
overeducated in 1976, individuals from higher quality colleges were more likely to leave 
the classification by 1985. Workers who attended higher quality colleges are found to 
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have a lower probability of being overeducated. There is a negative relationship between 
college quality and the probability of being overeducated and a positive relationship 
between college quality and the probability of leaving overeducation status.  
            Bauer (2002) examined the wage effects of educational mismatch by using a 
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) data set with controlling unobserved 
heterogeneity. He found that the estimated differences between adequately and 
inadequately educated workers become smaller or disappear totally after controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. A potential problem of the existing studies, however, lies in 
the data sets that they have used, since most employ only cross-sectional data. It is 
possible that the estimation results of these studies are biased due to unobserved 
heterogeneity of individuals. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity might be 
important if the probability of educational mismatch is correlated with innate ability. 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity might be important if individuals with lower 
innate ability need more education to attain a job for which they are formally 
overeducated.  
            Bauer compared results from three different specifications: V-V model, pooled 
OLS, Random effects, and Fixed effects. He used two measurements for mismatch: mean 
plus/minus one standard deviation and modal value. The results for the pooled OLS 
suggest that overeducated male workers earn 10.6% less and undereducated male workers 
8% more than male workers with the same amount of education who are working in 
occupations which fully utilize their educational level. For both the random effects and 
the fixed effects model, the estimated coefficients of the educational mismatch dummies 
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change in the expected direction. In most cases, the absolute values of the estimated 
coefficients on the dummies indicating educational mismatch are significantly lower 
when unobserved characteristics are accounted for. The estimated effects change 
dramatically when one controls for unobserved heterogeneity using panel estimation 
techniques. The earnings differences between inadequately educated workers and equally 
educated workers who work in occupations for which they are adequately educated 
becomes at least smaller, and in most cases disappears totally.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
HYPOTHETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Figure 3. Hypothetical Framework 
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            Figure 3 shows the hypothetical framework for this paper; the arrows imply 
possible causality flow. I claim that there is a cause and effect relationship between 
Sputnik and educational reform in U.S. in early 1960s. By introducing a Sputnik into the 
educational reform in U.S., I argue that educational reform in U.S. did not arise based on 
domestic needs but it was triggered by an exogenous event. First, I use the Arms Race 
Model to support the linkage between Sputnik and educational reform in U.S. Second, I 
use John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model to explain the policy process of producing 
policy outputs related with science and defense. Third, the initial purpose of federal 
funding was diffused to producing more general human capitals for economic growth 
under the subsequent domestic programs such as Civil Rights and Great Society. Fourth, 
I focus on three policy outputs related with higher education: NSF, NDEA (1958), and 
HEA (1965). Fifth, I interpret the increase in the supply of college graduates as a policy 
outcome, combining the NSF, NDEA, and HEA. Sixth, there are three economic issues 
that I analyze with an empirical study: occupational segregation between skilled and 
unskilled workers, overeducation, and college wage premium.  
 
           1. Arms Race Model 
            Arms Race Model provides theoretical perspectives about the reaction of the 
American government reflecting the rivalry relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. In other words, the American government perceived Sputnik 
as more a military threat than a simple scientific and technological achievement. They 
thought that if a country is able to govern space, it will be able to dominate over the 
world. Therefore, I interpret the reaction of the American government as an extension of 
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the arms race, instead of merely a science educational competition. The following three 
arms race models provide a single dominant strategy for American government against 
the Soviet launching of Sputnik.  
 
             1-1. Richardson’s arms race model  
 
            According to the Richardson’s (1960) arms race model between two countries, the 
rate of change in a country’s level of armaments is negative to its own level of 
armaments, but positive to its enemy’s level of armaments. It is mathematically expressed 
by a set of linear differential equations. For example, let’s say the two countries are U.S. 
and the Soviet Union. The equations would be as follows: 
𝑑(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑎 − 𝑏(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎) + 𝑐(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑠)  
𝑑(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑠)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑑 − 𝑒(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 𝑓(𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎)  
The coefficients 𝑎 and 𝑑 are “grievances” which derive nations to arm at a constant rate, 
and coefficients 𝑏 and 𝑒 are “fatigue and expense” caused by economic burden, and 𝑐 and 
𝑓 are called “defense coefficients” which measure each nation’s reaction to its 
opponent’s armaments. Thus, the equations tell us that change in America’s armaments 
positively relates with the level of Soviet’s armaments and vice versa. 
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Figure 4. Military Expenditure Reaction Functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It does not mean that there is no equilibrium. Figure 4 shows the military expenditure 
response functions for the Soviet Union and America. In the above equations, A 
represents America and S represents the Soviet Union. Let’s say that the initial 
equilibrium is E1. Considering the arms race, if the Soviet Union increases its military 
expenditure, the new equilibrium will be E2, which triggers America’s response, and the 
correspondingly increase in military expenditure by America raises the new equilibrium 
level of expenditure to E3. Therefore, America’s best reaction is increased military 
expenditure corresponding to the Soviets’. However, why does either of the countries try 
to break the equilibrium? The following Prisoner’s Dilemma Game gives an answer. 
 
               1-2. The Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game  
 
               Brams et al. (1979) modeled a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for the arms race by 
with which they explained why one side broke the equilibrium. 
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Table 2. The Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
  USSR 
  Disarm Arm 
          US 
Disarm 
 USSR: 0 USSR: 45 
US: 0 US: -30 
    Arm 
USSR: -30 USSR: -5 
US: 45 US: -5 
 
 
Table 2 shows a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for an arms race between two countries, 
America and Soviet Union. The numbers in each box are payoffs for the strategy for each 
country. According to the payoff, the dilemma in this game is that Arm is the dominant 
strategy for both countries. In other words, regardless of the other country’s strategy, 
each country obtains a higher payoff by choosing Arm, which means that America’s best 
strategy does not depend on whatever the Soviet Union chooses. If both countries choose 
Disarm, then payoff is (US: 0, USSR: 0), but there cannot be an equilibrium because each 
country has an incentive to choose Arm and thus obtain its highest payoff (US: 45 or 
USSR: 45) and imposes the worst payoff on the other player (USSR: -30 or US: -30). 
Therefore, choosing Arm, (US: -5, USSR: -5), is the unique equilibrium. 
 
               1-3. Competitive Arms Accumulation Model 
 
                Ploeg and Zeeuw (1990) show a competitive arms accumulation model 
between two countries in the form of utilities, which depend on consumption, leisure and 
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the characteristic defense. In their model, government finances the investment in arms by 
non-distortionary taxation and representative household maximizes utility and firm 
maximizes profits. 
Government’s budget constraint: ɡ = τ 
          ɡ: government investment, τ: lump-sum taxes 
Household maximizes utility: 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙, 𝑑) subject to budget constraint 𝑜 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑤𝑙 + 𝜋 −  𝜏 
        𝑐: 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑙: 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, d: defense, w: real wage, π: profits, τ: lump-sum 
taxes. 
Firm maximizes profit:  𝜋 = 𝑓(𝑙) − 𝑤𝑙 
        𝑓: 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑤 = 𝑓 ,(𝑙) 
Goods market equilibrium: 𝑓(𝑙) = 𝑐 + 𝑔 
In the model, utility is assumed to be separable in defense, which is a function of a 
country’s own weapon stock and foreign weapon stock, that is d=D (a, a*), where ‘a’ 
denotes own weapon stock and ‘a*’ denotes foreign weapon stock. It is assumed that 
defense is an increasing function of one’s own weapon stock, a, 𝑑𝐷 𝑑𝑎⁄ > 0, while it is a 
decreasing function of the foreign weapon stock, a*, 𝑑𝐷 𝑑𝑎∗⁄ < 0. Moreover, equal 
increase in the weapon stocks of two countries leaves the level of defense unaffected, 
which is 𝑑𝐷 𝑑𝑎⁄ =  − 𝑑𝐷 𝑑𝑎∗⁄ > 0. If we assume that the two countries are America and 
the Soviet Union, ‘a’ represents the level of armaments of U.S. and ‘a*’ represents the 
level of armaments of the Soviet Union. Therefore, for the representative household in 
the U.S., utility from defense is increased by the level of armaments of the U.S. but 
decreased by increasing the level of armaments of the Soviet Union. To satisfy 
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equilibrium condition, 𝑑𝐷 𝑑𝑎⁄ =  − 𝑑𝐷 𝑑𝑎∗⁄ , the American government should increase 
the level of armaments, as well as tax collections.   
            In summary, Richardson’s linear differential equations for the arms race model 
are inversely related to a country’s own weapon stocks because of economic burden, but 
positively related to the competing country’s weapon stock because of the threat. Brams’ 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for the arms race shows that a country can obtain the highest 
payoff by arming, regardless of the competitive country’s strategy. Ploeg and Zeeuw’s 
competitive arms accumulation model tells us that increase in the weapon stocks of the 
competitive country causes disutility of the representative household in the home country. 
Equilibrium is achieved when the level of weapon stocks are equal in both countries. 
Therefore, the responses of the American government, which are educational reform and 
expanding government expenditure for armaments, are justified by these three arms race 
models.  
 
            2. Agenda Setting by Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model 
 
            Kingdon’s multiple streams model is a popular theoretical perspective used to 
explain the dynamic and complex agenda-setting process. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams 
Policy Making is based on three independent process streams: problems, policies, and 
politics. When any two streams are coupled, they change a circumstance and enhance the 
probability of an issue being on the government’s decision agenda (Young et al. 2010). 
Sometimes the policy window is opened by a problem that presses in on government, or 
at least comes to be regarded as pressing (Kingdon, 2013). According to Kingdon, the 
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problem stream explains why some problems come to occupy the attention of 
government officials. The problem stream involves the process of problem recognition by 
indicators, focusing events, and feedback. Indicators are used to assess the magnitude of 
the condition, a focusing event draws attention to some conditions more than to others, 
and officials learn about conditions through feedback about the operation of existing 
programs. Conditions come to be defined as problems, and have a better chance of rising 
on the agenda, when we come to believe that we should do something to change them.  
            The political streams model explains the relative prominence of issues on official 
agenda. Independently of problem recognition, political events flow along according to 
their own dynamics and their own rules. Participants perceive a swing in national mood, 
elections bring new administrations to power and new partisan or ideological 
distributions to Congress, and interest groups of various descriptions press their demands 
on government. Policy stream addresses alternative specifications by members of the 
policy community. Policy communities include policy actors inside and outside of the 
government. I want to explain the educational agenda setting in the U.S. inspired by 
Soviet launching of Sputnik by applying Multiple Streams Model. 
 
             2-1. Problem Stream 
 
             Problem stream focuses on the exogenous events of the sequential success of 
launching Sputnik 1, Sputnik 2, and Sputnik 3, and its impact on American society and 
corresponding problem recognition by Americans. Soviet Union launched world’s first 
man-made artificial Earth satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957. The American public, 
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politicians, and military associates were surprised because the launching of a satellite was 
a technological, scientific, and military achievement. Moreover, the success of Sputnik 1 
seemed to have changed minds around the world regarding a shift in technological 
leadership and military power to the Soviet Union from the United States. 
            When Americans witnessed the great success of Soviet space technology with the 
launching of Sputnik in 1957, they stood in fear of the new aspect of the Soviet threat 
(Lucena 2005, p.27). Some sectors of industry and the public responded by incorporating 
the new objects of fear into consumer goods. Restaurants began serving 
“Sputnikburgers,” and bars sold “Sputnik cocktails” (Lucena 2005, p.27). When 
Americans get worried, their fear quickly spreads to the stock market. On October 7, the 
Dow Jones index declined 6.32 points and two weeks later the market experienced its 
largest one-day loss in two years (Degroot 2006, p.63). A month after the launch, opinion 
polls showed that a majority of Americans considered Sputnik a blow to their nation’s 
prestige, and a roughly equal percentage believed that the United States was behind the 
Soviets in space research, with a significant number believing the gap “dangerously” 
large (Degroot 2006, p. 67-68).  
             In a field-by-field survey of all Russian sciences, scientific experts from all over 
the world agreed that, although the USSR lagged in some fields of applied science, it led 
the U.S. in most fields of basic scientific research. “What is important about the Russian 
satellites is the base of science beneath them,” (Lucena 2005, p.29). Scientific academics 
(Vannevar Bush, James Conant, and James Killian) defined the new problem facing the 
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American nation not only in terms of basic science and scientists but also in terms of 
science education (Lucena 2005, p.30).  
            A group of scientists, James Conant (Chairman of the National Science Board), 
Nicholas DeWitt (the NSF commission), and Alan Waterman (Director of NSF) criticized 
the U.S. for producing too many businessman, lawyers, and humanities scholars and not 
enough scientists and engineers (Lucena 2005, p.22). A couple of months after Sputnik, 
Eisenhower made an official statement that national security is for the most critical 
problem of all for the American people and asserted that the United States needed 
thousands more scientists than were currently active (Lucena 2005, p.30). After Sputnik 
went up, all the talk was about the “fact” that Russian kids went to school for six hours a 
day, six days a week, and got shorter summer holidays than American children (Degroot 
2006, p.76). An official report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare made 
the preposterous claim that all Russian children took five years of physics, four of 
chemistry, and five of mathematics (Degroot 2006, p.76). 
            On November 3, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 2, a satellite weighing 
about 500 kilos, about the size of small car. Even more remarkable than the weight was 
the fact that the capsule contained a dog named Laika, and the systems necessary to keep 
it alive for a short time (Degroot 2006, p.80). Once Laika went into orbit, Soviet and 
American perceptions of space changed radically. Up until that point, the important issue 
was the Soviet ability to lift very heavy objects into orbit. That capability seemed to 
threaten U.S. security (Degroot 2006, p.81). 
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             On December 6, 1957, the United States made its first attempt to place a satellite 
in orbit. The Vanguard team had a relatively new rocket that had not been fully tested 
(Degroot 2006, p.82). At 11:44:55 AM on Friday, December 6, 1957, the slender rocket 
rose slowly from its launch pad. After two seconds, and at an elevation of about four feet, 
it abandoned the struggle. It shuddered, then collapsed in a fiery heap. The American 
satellite was nicknamed Stayputnik, Flopnik, Oopsnik, Pfftnik, and Sputternik (Degroot 
2006, p.83). Sputnik 2 continued to broadcast its signal until early December, thus 
pouring salt on American wounds (Degroot 2006, p.84). The president was identified 
with Vanguard’s failure and therefore had to share its ignominy (Degroot 2006, p.87). 
            Eisenhower’s space woes were compounded by talk of a missile gap. On 
November 12, 1957, in the wake of Sputnik, a national intelligence estimate forecast that 
the Soviets would have five hundred operational ICBMs by the end of 1962, while the 
United States would have only around sixty-five. On the strength of this evidence, 
Eisenhower was lambasted for endangering the security of the United States, even though 
the American lead in bombers and total nuclear weapons was still huge (Degroot 2006, 
p.91). 
            For most Americans, the “missile gap” and the space race were two sides of the 
same coin. The public was growing increasingly impatient with Eisenhower’s 
leadership—or lack thereof. They demanded action, especially after the success of 
Explorer 1 was followed quickly by the embarrassing failure of a second Vanguard, and 
then by the crash of Explorer 2 (Degroot 2006, 92). 
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             On May 15, 1958, the Soviets again emphasized their supremacy in heavy lifting 
by launching Sputnik 3, a behemoth weighing nearly 1,400 kilos. The new capsule, one 
Russian scientist stressed, “could easily carry a man with a stock of food and 
supplementary equipment.” (Degroot 2006, 94). 
            In the problem stream, Americans started to recognize that they needed to address 
three specific deficits: (1) the numbers of scientists, (2) science education and curriculum, 
and (3) a lack of science education from K-12 to college, as well as further basic 
scientific researches in higher education. Prior to 1957, the problem was defined as a 
matter of numbers in the armed forces (Lucena 2005, p.31). With a more accurate 
recognition of the problems facing the United States and its space program, scientists, the 
White House, and Congress started to find policies to solve these specific problems. 
 
            2-2. Policy Stream 
 
            The American government recognized that the Soviet Union was far ahead of 
America in basic scientific research. Immediately after Sputnik, one of the first requests 
by both Congress and the President was to find out the number of scientists and engineers 
available to meet the needs of the nation (Lucena 2005, p.46).  
           The popular media had better success in shifting the national attention from the 
shortfall in numbers to science education (Lucena 2005, p.30). In early 1958, Life 
magazine ran a five-part series on the “Crisis in Education” that explored every aspect of 
“the field of battle for future brain power-the U.S. and the Russian schools.” (Lucena 
2005, p.30). The series of articles concluded with James Conant’s blueprint for high 
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school curriculum in which he pointed out the basic problem of U.S. education, and 
proposed a meritocratic educational system (Lucena 2005, p.31).  
            President Eisenhower selected MIT President James Killian as his full-time 
Special Assistant for Science and Technology and established the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC) (Lucena, 38). In 1951, President Harry S. Truman had 
established the Science Advisory Committee as part of the Office of Defense 
Mobilization (ODM). As a direct response to the launches of the Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2, 
on October 4 and November 3, 1957, the Science Advisory Committee was upgraded by 
President Eisenhower to the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and moved 
to the White House on 21 November 1957. These appointments opened the White House 
doors to scientific academism. Robert Kreidler claims that with these appointments 
“members of the scientific community were given direct access to the President and an 
established means of expressing themselves on matters of science policy (Lucena, 38). 
            On Oct 10, 1957, only six days after Sputnik’s launch, director of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) Alan Waterman, beginning his quest for money for science 
education, told the National Security Council the necessity for effective steps toward 
maintaining progress in basic science and the training of capable scientists and engineers 
(Lucena, p.41). The President’s budget and subsequent congressional appropriation for 
FY 1959 resulted in an increase of 300 percent, to approximately $61 million, for existing 
NSF educational programs and for the initiation of new ones. The percentage of the 
NSF’s total budget ($137 million) devoted to education reached an all-time high of 45% 
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(Lucena, p.41). NSF began to emerge as an institutional solution for the manpower 
political problem of the 1960s (Lucena 2005, p.38). 
            When asked by legislators to explain what was wrong with American science, 
German rocket scientist Werner Von Braun called for a massive injection of money and 
effort to be directed to the teaching of science (Degroot 2006, p.75). Legislators 
responded with calls for a Manhattan Project for space and a West Point for science 
(Degroot 2006, p.75). The Advanced Research Projects Agency was created to make sure 
that Americans were kept busy with technological projects, not exclusively related to 
space, designed to make sure that the United States would never again fall victim to an 
embarrassment like Sputnik (Degroot 2006, p.75). The National Defense Education Act 
(NDEA) was rocketed through Congress and signed into law by Eisenhower on 
September 2, 1958 (Degroot 2006, p.75). A four-year plan for boosting American 
education, it provided millions for the purchase of scientific equipment for schools, in 
addition to loans and grants for those inclined to go into teaching (Degroot 2006, p.75). 
Before long, the NDEA was giving out scholarships to almost any high school graduate 
who could present a credible case for wanting to study science at a university (Degroot 
2006, p.75). 
            Immediate policies and proposals emerged after Sputnik that involved the 
extension of NSF’s role to nurture elite scientists, establishing the President’s Science 
Advisory Committee (PSAC), and the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958. 
The purposes of proposed policies were not an increase in armed forces but in enhancing 
science education and producing scientists needed for national security. 
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            2-3. Politics Stream 
 
            The politics stream focuses on the interactions between political actors, Congress, 
White House, and interest groups with regard to changes in national mood and elections 
that bring new administrations to power. Sputnik brought a test on Presidential leadership 
and Congressional ability to overcome an imbalance of the superpowers and provide an 
improved course for the United States’ science program.   
            Initially, President Eisenhower was not surprised by Sputnik because he had 
expected the event because of information derived from U2 spy planes’ flyover photos. 
President Eisenhower steadfastly refused to panic (Degroot 2006, p.77). On October 9, 
Eisenhower told a press conference that he saw “nothing…that is significant in that 
development as far as security is concerned, except…it does definitely prove the 
possession of the Russian scientists of a very powerful thrust in their rocketry…The mere 
fact that this thing orbits involves no new discovery of science…so in itself it imposes no 
additional threat to the United States.” (Degroot 2006, p.77). He went on to allege that 
the reason the Russians had been first in space was because they had “captured all the 
German scientists” in Peenemunde (Degroot 2006, p.77). He played five rounds of golf 
during the week after the launch, perhaps to drive home the suggestion of calm (Degroot 
2006, p.66).  Meanwhile, James Hagerty, the White House press secretary, told 
journalists that the satellite, while of great scientific interest” did not come as any 
surprise; we have never thought of our program as in a race with the Soviet.” (Degroot 
2006, p.66). 
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            Sensing an electoral opportunity, Senator Lyndon Johnson seized the chance to 
weight in: “The issue is one which, if properly handled, would blast the Republicans out 
of water, unify the Democrat Party, and elect you President.” an aid told the ambitious 
senator (Degroot 2006, p.69). Before Sputnik, the Democrats were mired in gloom. The 
segregation issue, which had split the party, seemed likely to destroy their chances of 
regaining the White House (Degroot 2006, p.69). “The Roman Empire,” Johnson 
claimed, “controlled the world because it could build roads. Later the British Empire was 
dominant because it had ships. In the air age we were powerful because we had airplanes. 
Now the communists have established a foothold in outer space.” (Degroot, p.70). The 
history lesson might have been crude and simplistic, but the American people lapped it 
up. On another occasion, he claimed: “From space the masters of infinity would have the 
power to control the Earth’s weather, to cause drought and flood, to change the tides and 
raise the levels of the sea, to divert the Gulf Stream and change temperate climates to 
frigid.” (Degroot 2006, p.70). He promised that, whatever the administration’s space 
budget, he would convince Congress to increase it, a promise that alarmed the fiscally 
conservative Eisenhower. (Degroot 2006, p.70). 
             In the November edition of Missiles and Rockets, Editor Erik Bergaust wrote “An 
Open Letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower.” The editorial expressed all the 
emotions the president feared. “This is the age of science,” Bergaust warned Eisenhower. 
“This is the era of intellectual, uninhibited thinking. Tomorrow is here. And you, as the 
leader of the greatest nation on Earth, must see to it that this nation will be out in front as 
mankind advances into the space age.” (Degroot 2006, p.81). Bergaust called for a 
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cabinet-level science adviser, a coherent space program, a new space agency, and 
missions to the Moon, Venus, and Mars (Degroot 2006, p.81). 
            Eisenhower realized that he could not simply ignore the American people’s 
feelings of inadequacy. On November 7, before a radio and television audience, he 
delivered the first of his “Science in National Security” talks from the White House. It 
was in part shaped by a report from the Office of Defense Mobilization and Science 
Advisory Committee (ODM-SAC) on the need to improve public appreciation of science, 
strengthen the partnership between sciences and the federal government, increase support 
for basic research, especially in the Department of Defense, and reform science education 
(Wang 2008, p.81). In this address, Eisenhower highlighted science not only as the 
driving force in the defense of America, but also as a key to the nation’s future security 
and prosperity (Wang 2008, p.82). In response to critics who derided the state of 
scientific education in the United States, the president announced that he was appointing 
James Killian of MIT the first White House science adviser. (Degroot 2006, p.81). A 
week later, in another speech on national security, Eisenhower expanded on the 
importance of science education and basic research: “My scientific advisers place this 
problem (science education) above all other immediate tasks of producing missiles, of 
developing new techniques in the Armed Services.” (Wang 2008, p.82). The upgrade of 
the Office of Defense Mobilization and Science Advisory Committee (ODM-SAC) into 
the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in the White House proceeded soon 
after the Killian appointment (Wang 2008, p.82). 
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             In the beginning of 1958, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the U.S. 
Congress held some Congressional hearings on “Science and Education for National 
Defense” (Lucena 2005, p.31). Senator Lister Hill (D-Ala) shaped the limits of discourse 
by enrolling powerful actors such as German rocket scientist Werner Von Braun and U.S. 
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. Both endorsed education programs that were oriented 
towards creating a scientific elite. With an impressive lineup of elite scientists, scientific 
academics, and high-ranked military officials, Congressional leaders such as Hill were 
able to speak of a nation under threat, not just from Soviet communism, but from its 
science and technology (Lucena 2005, p.32). Chairman Hill opened the door for 
supporting basic scientific research and “brainpower” as means for national survival 
(Lucena 2005, p.33). 
            On April 2, 1958, before a joint session of Congress, Eisenhower called for the 
formation of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The new 
agency, which implied a huge investment in space research and development, was 
precisely what Eisenhower had wanted to avoid. However, in the hysteria that followed 
Sputnik, it was the least he could get away with offering. Eisenhower appointed Keith 
Glennan, president of the Case Institute of Technology, the first administrator of the new 
agency. The new administrator quickly found that Congress was desperate for a race and 
had no scruples about throwing money into space. (Degroot 2006, p.95). 
             In July 1958, the White House let it be known that it wanted something really big 
to counter the impact made by Sputnik 3. Project Score involved broadcasting a recorded 
message from a satellite circling the Earth. (Degroot 2006, 97).   
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            Initially, President Eisenhower tried to avoid a race to space with the Soviet 
Union because of the economic burden, but the media formed public opinion on demand 
for science education, and the continuous success of Sputnik 2 and Sputnik 3 made him 
take actions. He organized a new science committee and appointed new leadership, and 
Congress approved a budget for government agencies and passed an educational act to 
improve quality and quantity in science education and scientists. Overall, problem 
stream, policy stream, and politics stream all played a part in improving and developing 
scientific manpower in America. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
            In this chapter, I want to contemplate government financial aid for education in 
viewpoints of paternalism and public choice because the nature of policy issues on 
education is its redistributive aspect and increasing human capitals. In addition, President 
Kennedy and President Johnson were interested in civil rights, eliminating poverty, and 
racial injustice. Therefore, science and defense-focused educational reform was shifted to 
produce more general human capital for economic growth of the nation and to the 
increase of opportunity to access higher education by poor students. Johnson passed the 
Higher Education Act on November 8, 1965 by his Great Society domestic agenda. HEA 
1965 was designed to provide financial aid to the needy students from lower income 
families. Redistributive policies that transfer value to the less advantaged at the expense 
of the more advantaged require the convergence of significant forces (Hannah 1996, 
p.502). For example, the initiation of basic educational opportunity grants for 
postsecondary students with exceptional financial need in HEA 1965 required 
presidential leadership, Congressional support, a broad national constituency in the ‘war 
on poverty’, the momentum of the civil movement, and a growing economy that could 
afford redistribution (Hannah 1996, p.502). 
 
            1. Paternalism 
 
             Eyal Zamir (2007) defines paternalism as intervention in a person’s freedom 
aimed at furthering his or her own good. Gerald Dworkin (1972), however, suggests that 
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paternalism is justified only to preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in 
question. He says that the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values 
of the person being coerced. He provides examples of paternalistic interference: laws 
requiring motorcyclists to wear safety helmets when operating their machines, laws 
forbidding persons from swimming at a public beach when lifeguards are not on duty, 
and so on, which place restrictions on the liberty of individuals. I interpret Dworkin’s 
paternalistic intervention as an intent to reduce disutility from what otherwise would have 
happened with no intervention.  
            Isbister (2004) asserts that social justice has three components: equality, freedom, 
and efficiency. He classifies equality as equality of opportunity and equality of resources, 
and distinguishes “freedoms-to” and “freedoms-from”. According to him, “freedoms-to” 
are freedoms to do various things such as freedom to worship, speak, publish, assemble, 
and petition the government for redress of grievances. “Freedoms-from” are freedoms 
from such afflictions as hunger, poverty, illiteracy, sickness, and homelessness (Isbister 
2004, p.16). I think that publicly provided education has a duality if one’s utility of being 
educated is at least of the same magnitude with one’s disutility of being illiterate.  
            Thaler and Sunstein (2003) suggest the idea of libertarian paternalism. Traditional 
paternalism involves coercion, although the intervention has a good motive. Thaler and 
Sunstein define libertarian paternalism as the intervention that nudges people in the 
direction that will promote their welfare with no coercion of choice. The government 
provides financial aid for higher education with no coercion of going to college, but 
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influences the decision of college enrollment by reducing the price of college education. 
As long as there is no penalty for dropping out of college due to lack of financial aid, the 
financial aid for college education is not coercion. Financial aid may bring a substitution 
effect by reducing the opportunity costs of staying in school, but also bring an income 
effect by reducing the price of education. Subsidies can reduce costs and thereby magnify 
the relative benefits. 
            Johnson (1984) provides three ways to justify government subsidization of higher 
education. First, there are gross social benefits from highly educated population. Second, 
it is socially inefficient not to provide the optimum amount of training to bright young 
people just because their families happen to be poor. Third, taxation affects private 
human capital accumulation decisions. Too high an income tax may undervalue of 
present discounted future income relative to costs after graduating college, which may 
affect the decision of college enrollments. Therefore, subsidy can be used to correct for 
the distortions caused by the tax system. 
            According to Isbister (2004), efficiency means getting the best out of the available 
resources. Therefore, it is socially inefficient for bright young people from poor 
households to be left with inadequate education because society does not get the best out 
of the available resources and also does not provide them a “freedom-to” receive 
education or a “freedom-from” being illiterate. A paternalistic state must provide the 
population access to receive public education and also prevent the population from being 
illiterate, and thus population can have a wider range of freedom.  
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            Leonard et al (2000), however, assert that truly paternalistic policies are 
distinguishable from interventions intended to correct market failures that arise from 
insufficient information, because even a non-paternalistic state can provide information 
to the market. They insist that a paternalist is logically required to believe that the 
intervener is better placed than the paternalized person to judge the latter’s welfare. 
            In terms of educational costs, parents are expected to contribute to the cost of 
their children’s postsecondary education. However when their ability is limited, 
government can provide an educational subsidy based on need. Trostel (2002) insists that 
a subsidy in the form of public provision has the potential to be the most efficient 
educational policy because it stimulates investment in human capital. He argues that there 
is no practical policy to lower the price of the primary input in human capital production. 
In other words, it is impractical to lower the opportunity cost of staying in school. 
Therefore, it is not practically possible to stimulate investment in education if there is no 
public provision of a subsidy.     
 
             2. Public Choice 
 
             Public Choice sees voters, politicians, and bureaucrats as self-interested agents 
who maximize their own utility. Mancur Olson (1993) shows how self-interested utility 
maximization motivates leaders in both autocracy and democracy to provide public goods 
to their domains. Thus altruism neither of a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition 
for providing public goods, especially for an autocrat. 
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            Mancur Olson (1993) introduces a new theory of how autocracies and 
democracies emerge from anarchy and affect economic development. Of particular 
interest is his theory about how a rational self-interested autocrat is motivated to provide 
public goods to his citizens, because it is the usual expectation that dictators are more 
likely to exploit the population ruthlessly in their domains rather than spending for public 
goods. In his theory, however, he emphasizes peaceful order and providing public goods 
to make society productive as common factors for both types of government, dictatorship 
and democracy. Under anarchy, victims of violence and theft lose what they produced 
and also lose the incentive to produce any more goods because roving bandits do not 
have any encompassing interest in society. When a roving bandit may steal goods 
occasionally and depart immediately, inhabitants can have little incentive to produce or 
way to secure accumulate goods. However, if a bandit settles down as a stationary bandit, 
he may have an encompassing interest in his domain that encourages him to support a 
peaceful order and public goods that increase productivity. According to Olson, having a 
dictator as a stationary bandit is better for both the population and the bandit himself in 
the sense that the bandit can monopolize theft in the form of taxes regularly and 
continuously, and inhabitants can have their own “safe” income after tax and are 
provided protection from other thieves. Such protections from other thieves and property 
rights on after-tax goods increase output in the society and thus provide more tax 
payments to the leader (the stationary bandit). Contrary to the roving bandits, under the 
stationary bandit, inhabitants are not a resource to be exploited but a source of tax 
payments. Therefore, the leader as stationary bandit has an incentive to protect 
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inhabitants in his domain from domestic violence and foreign thieves, and to provide any 
public goods that can increase taxable income up to the point where the marginal cost of 
providing public goods is equal to the marginal income from increased output.  
            The rational self-interested autocrat chooses the revenue-maximizing tax rate 
instead of behaving like the wolf that preys on the elk. Therefore, monopolization of theft 
and the protection of the tax-generating population replaces anarchy with government. 
The rational stationary bandit takes only a part of income in taxes, while he has an 
incentive to provide other public goods, which can increase taxable income. By providing 
more public goods he can thieve more from his subjects in the form of taxes than he 
could have stolen by being a roving bandit. Olson says that this mutual incentive from 
settling a government is very effective, even in the democratic community, because a 
self-interested incumbent president will maximize his chances of reelection by making 
the voters better off. 
 
            3. Expansion of Reform 
 
            John F. Kennedy became the 35the President of the United States in 1961. He 
served as President from January 1961 until his assassination in November 1963. 
Kennedy’s time in office is also marked by high tensions with Communist states, Soviet 
Union and Cuba in particular. Since when he was a senator, he was interested in civil 
rights movements. Kennedy cast a procedural vote on the President Eisenhower’s bill for 
the Civil Rights Act of 1957. His concerns about civil rights were reflected in his 
domestic policy, which was called the New Frontier. Through the New Frontier, he 
ambitiously promised federal funding for education, medical care for the elderly, 
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economic aid to rural regions, and government intervention to halt the recession. 
Moreover, he promised to eliminate racial discrimination. Especially, his racial 
integration was very well reflected in his Executive Order 10925, which required 
government contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that employees are treated 
fairly without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. 
            On December 14, 1961, Kennedy signed the executive order creating the 
Presidential commission on the Status of Women concerning on sexual discrimination. 
On June 10, 1963, Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act of 1963 aiming at abolishing wage 
disparity based on sex. On June 11, 1963, Kennedy gave his famous civil rights address, 
on national television and radio to provide equal access to public schools and voting 
rights.  
            Sputnik-inspired educational reform was concentrated in science and national 
defense related educations led by NSF and NDEA, during the administration of President 
Eisenhower. However, as described above, until assassinated on November 22, 1963, 
Kennedy had many concerns on civil rights, racial integration, and equal opportunity of 
education. These concerns of Kennedy’s domestic policy started to shift the emphasis of 
educational reform from science to equal opportunity to access all level of educations 
with no racial or sexual discrimination. It does not mean that Kennedy gave up science 
education or the space race with the Soviet Union. In fact, he became eager for the United 
States to take the lead in the space race by a manned Moon landing (the Apollo program). 
On July 20, 1969, almost six years after Kennedy's death, Apollo 11 landed the first 
manned spacecraft on the Moon. 
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            President Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, pushed the landmark Civil 
Rights Act through a bitterly divided Congress by invoking the slain president's memory. 
Finally, President Johnson signed the Act into law on July 2, 1964. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 ended unequal application of voter registration requirements and racial 
segregation in schools, at the workplace and by facilities that served the general public. 
             While Kennedy emphasized equality under his domestic policy, the New 
Frontier, Johnson’s domestic program, Great Society, aimed at elimination of poverty and 
racial injustice. New major spending programs were about education, medical care, urban 
problems, and transportation. The most important educational component of the Great 
Society was the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, which was 
enacted on April 11, 1965. During its first year of operation, the Act authorized a $1.1 
billion program of grants to states, for allocations to school districts with large numbers 
of children of low income families, funds to use community facilities for education 
within the entire community, funds to improve educational research and to strengthen 
state departments of education, and grants for the purchase of books and library materials 
(Voting Record, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 19657).  
            In regard to a policy for higher education, the Higher Education Facilities Act 
(HEFA) of 1963 was signed into law on December 16, 1963, authorized several times 
more college aid within a five-year period than had been appropriated under the Land 
Grant College in a century8. It provided better college libraries, new graduate centers, 
                                                 
7 Americans for Democratic Action. http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php 
8 Remarks Upon Signing the Higher Education Facilities Act, December 16, 1963. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26387 
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several new technical institutes, classrooms for several hundred thousand students, and 
new community colleges a year. The Higher Education Act of 1965 was enacted on 
November 8, 1965. The law was intended to strengthen the educational resources of 
colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students in postsecondary 
and higher education. It increased federal money given to universities, created 
scholarships and low-interest loans for students, and established a national Teacher Corps 
to provide teachers to poverty-stricken areas of the United States. The Act also began a 
transition from federally funded institutional assistance to individual student aid. 
            In summary, Sputnik-inspired educational reform raised federal funding for 
defense and space exploration by improving science and engineering education during 
Eisenhower. NSF and NDEA were instrumental for producing science and defense 
related human capitals. Science and defense emphasizing education was diffused to 
producing more general human capitals for economic growth in the administrations of 
President Kennedy and the President Johnson. Kennedy’s domestic program, the New 
Frontier, was interested in racial integration and the civil rights of African Americans, 
women’s equal rights in the work place, and Johnson’s domestic program, the Great 
Society, was aimed at elimination of poverty and racial injustice. Kennedy’s educational 
concern was more on equal opportunity of accessing public education by minorites than 
Eisenhower’s science and defense education. Johnson enacted ESEA, HEFA, and HEA to 
provide federal aid for educational institutions, facilities, and students. His educational 
policy, led by the federal government, ended a long-standing political taboo by providing 
significant federal aid to public education, and also began to switch its purpose from 
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providing federal funding to institutions to individual students. Giving financial aid to 
students directly might give students more freedoms to choose college to go into a 
particular field of study to major. Moreover, figures in the next chapter show an 
increasing trend of college enrollments in the 1960s. Diffusing educational policy from 
science and defense to all levels of educations might attribute to increasing in college 
enrollments. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
POLICY OUTPUTS and COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS 
 
              So far, I have described a cause and effect relationship between the Soviet 
launching of Sputnik 1 and educational reform (policy event) in America. In this chapter, 
I want to look inside three selected policy outputs: National Science Foundation (NSF), 
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, and Higher Education Act (HEA) of 
1965. 
 
            1. National Science Foundation (NSF) 
 
            Signed into law on May 10, 1950, by President Truman, the NSF Act of 1950 
authorized and directed the new Foundation “to promote the progress of science, to 
advance the national health, prosperity and welfare, to secure the national defense, and to 
fulfill other purposes” (Lucena 2005, p.12-13). Although Congress did not intend for 
NSF to be a mission-oriented agency, like the Department of Agriculture or NASA, the 
Act of 1950 implicitly defined a national mission for NSF (Lucena 2005, p.13). NSF has 
been in charge of developing and promoting science and engineering education and 
human resources (Lucena 2005, p.13).  
           After the launching of Sputnik in 1957, NSF has responded to different needs for 
scientists and engineers brought upon by national crises in two ways: its human-resource 
programs, such as the National Register and Manpower, and its education programs 
(Lucena 2005, p.13). The NSF Fellowship program has been scientific academia’s 
instrument to ensure high-quality training to a small cadre of top-level scientists. By 
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1956, NSF Fellowships were of two kinds: pre-doctoral and postdoctoral. The objective 
of the pre-doctoral program was to seek out the most able science students interested in 
training beyond the baccalaureate degree and to afford them the opportunity to spend full 
time at the institutions of their choice so that each fellow could develop his or her 
potentiality as a scientist to the fullest (Lucena 2005, p.39). The post-doctoral 
fellowships’ main goal was to provide opportunities for scientists who demonstrated 
superior accomplishments in a special field to become still more proficient in their 
respective specialty by studying and doing research in outstanding laboratories (Lucena 
2005, p.40). After Sputnik, scientific academia framed the specific problem of education 
for the NSF as follows: how to provide high-quality education in the sciences to the best 
and brightest of free-choosing individuals who will save the nation. Only six days after 
Sputnik’s launch, Alan Waterman, began his quest for money for science education. The 
President’s budget and subsequent Congressional appropriation for FY 1959 resulted in 
an increase of 300 percent, or approximately $61 million, to existing NSF educational 
programs and the initiation of new ones. The percentage of the NSF’s total budget ($137 
million) devoted to education reached an all-time high of 45% (Lucena 2005, p.41).  
            By connecting the quality of scientific training to the survival of the nation, NSF 
was able to increase its fellowships budget by more than 100% immediately after 
Sputnik, from $5.6 million (1527 awards) in FY 1958 to $13 million (3937 awards) in FY 
1959 (Lucena 2005, p.43). While in 1956, only two kinds of fellowships existed, by the 
early 1960s, the program had developed into seven types of fellowships (Lucena 2005, 
p.44). By 1959, the NSF, in cooperation with all federal agencies and scientific 
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organizations engaged in gathering information about scientific manpower, received an 
additional mandate from Congress to develop a national program of information on 
scientific and technical personnel. The NSF became the government’s repository for 
information about U.S. scientific and technological resources, including manpower 
(Lucena 2005, p.47). After Sputnik, the NSF emerged as an institutional solution to the 
political problem surrounding the production of scientific manpower (Lucena 2005, 
p.53).              
  
              2. National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 
 
            The National Defense Education Act was signed into law on September 2, 1958 
by President Eisenhower. The act authorized funding for four years, increasing funding 
each year. For example, funding increased on eight program titles from $183 million in 
1959 to $222 million in 1960. Under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Office of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, the NDEA provided funds to several kinds of educational 
programs: student loans; science, math and foreign language instruction; NDEA general 
fellowships; training institutes for counselors; language development research; new 
educational media; and vocational programs. It was the most sweeping federal education 
legislation in the nation’s history (Lucena 2005, p.35).  
            Although the NDEA had a major impact on general college education, it had a 
relatively minor impact on science education and manpower when compared to the NSF. 
The NDEA was oriented mostly to undergraduate loans and fellowships in all areas, and 
to increasing education in and providing facilities for foreign languages (Lucena 2005, 
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p.35). For example, during FY 1959-63, only 32% of NDEA funds for undergraduate 
fellowships went to the physical and natural sciences and 10% to engineering. Fifty-eight 
percent went to the social sciences and humanities. Although most of the NDEA’s 
activities were modeled after the NSF’s existing programs, the NDEA’s only legislative 
link to the NSF was through its authorization of the Scientific Information Service 
Program. The difference between NDEA and NSF programs can also be explained in the 
way each one defined the problems and solution, in terms of both quality and quantity. 
The NDEA was to provide federal assistance to the general population, or the “average” 
and “slow,” using Conant’s terms, mostly at elementary and secondary levels, thus 
producing large numbers of educated individuals to serve the nation’s needs in 
manufacturing, infrastructure, and basic services. The NDEA was to be managed by the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the same office of the 
federal government that also administered health and welfare programs. In short, it was a 
comprehensive federal education assistance program for the masses. Meanwhile, NSF 
programs provided federal assistance to the “best and brightest” with high-quality 
scientific education in order to produce the scientific elite that would lead the U.S.’s basic 
scientific research through the Cold War. The NSF, in other words, had become the 
headquarters of scientific academia (Lucena 2005, p.36). 
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            3. Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 
 
           The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) was signed into United States law on 
November 8, 1965, as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society domestic 
agenda. Education has historically been the exclusive administrative area for state and 
local governments. Compared to the NSF educational program and NDEA of 1958, the 
HEA provided the first general federal undergraduate scholarships in U.S. history. The 
law was designed to strengthen the educational resources of the colleges and universities 
of the United States and to provide financial assistance to post-secondary students. The 
HEA, as it is known, increased federal money given to post-secondary institutions, 
developed scholarship programs, provided low-interest loans to students, and founded a 
National Teachers Corps (National Center for Education Statistics).  
            The HEA 1965 has undergone several reauthorizations and amendments, 
including the addition of new title initiatives. Before each reauthorization, Congress 
inserts additional programs, changes the language and policies of existing programs, or 
makes other changes (National Center for Education Statistics). 
           The Higher Education Act of 1965 includes eight titles. Especially, Title IV assists 
students by supporting undergraduate scholarships, loans with reduced interest rates, and 
work-study programs. For the fiscal year 1966, the HEA 1965 provided total 
authorization about $1.1 billion for both institutional aid programs and student aid 
(McGuire, 2012). 
            In summary, the purpose of NSF educational program was to provide federal 
assistance to the best and brightest scientific elite, and the NDEA was to provide federal 
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assistance to the general population at elementary and secondary levels, and 
undergraduate programs for science, technology, engineering, mathematics fields. The 
purpose of HEA was not in developing science-oriented human capitals, but in 
supporting general postsecondary education. Therefore, the Sputnik-inspired educational 
reform in America has broadened its purpose and students who receive its financial 
support in various fields. The extension of NSF’s role in science education and an 
enactment of NDEA 1958 support the suggestion of causality between Sputnik and the 
initiation of educational reform in America in early 1960s. The HEA, as a successive 
policy, has been contributing in the increase of general college enrollments in various 
majors by reauthorization through the years. This paper treats the increase in the supply 
of college graduates as a policy outcome by combining of NSF, NDEA, and HEA, 
instead of evaluating each of them. The following section provides statistics on college 
enrollments by sex, family income, race, and age.  
 
              4. College Enrollments9 
 
              In 1940, less than one American adult in twenty (4.6 percent) was a college 
graduate, but the number had quadrupled to one in five (19.4percent) in 1986. The 
percentage of adults with college degrees in the late 1980s was higher than the percentage 
with high school diplomas in 1930. College enrollment was up 45 percent between 1970 
and 1983 but then leveled off (Orfield, 1990). 
 
                                                 
9 Data for all figures in this chapter are from Digest of Education Statistics in National Center for 
Education Statistics. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ 
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Figure 5. College Enrollments of Recent High School Completers, 16-24 Old 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of college enrollment from 1960 to 2012 among 16 to 24 
year olds. College enrollments increased drastically between 1960 and 1970. It might be 
due to the Sputnik-triggered federal government-led educational reform in early the 
1960s. As Freeman (1975) observed, however, college enrollments fell sharply between 
1969 and 1973, but began to increase after 1980. Skill-biased technological changes 
might be the driving force behind increased college enrollments by deriving demand for 
college graduates.  The overall trend of enrollment has been upward from 1960 to 2012. 
Especially, the percentage of enrollment of females is higher than that of males after 
1980. 
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Figure 6. Total Fall Enrollment by Sex 
 
 
Figure 6 shows total population of college enrollment in fall by sex, in which the number 
of college enrollments of females is higher than that of males from 1980, and the overall 
trend of enrollment is upward for the entire sample period. Figure 5 and Figure 6 reveal 
that, not only in percentage, but also in number, females’ demand for college education is 
higher than males since 1980. 
Figure 7. College Enrollment of Recent High School Completers by Income Level10
 
                                                 
10 Low income refers to the bottom 20% of all family incomes, high income refers to the top 20% of all 
family income, and middle income refers to the 60% in between. Digest of Education Statistics. 
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Figure 7 shows the percentage of college enrollment by family income level, reflecting 
the purpose of higher education policy. The trend of college enrollment of students who 
have high family income shows constant enrollment overtime, while the trend of college 
enrollment of those who have low family income shows substantial fluctuations, 
reflecting sensitive enrollment behavior responses to the government policy on grants or 
loans. In other words, government policy on grants or loans seems not to affect college 
enrollment for high income families, but it seems very important to the low income 
families. 
 
Figure 8. College Enrollment of Recent High School Completers by Race
 
 
Figure 8 shows the percentage of college enrollment by race between ages 16 and 24. In 
the early 1970s, college enrollment of Hispanics seemed higher than whites. Whites have 
a constant enrollment pattern, while enrollment patterns of Blacks and Hispanics show 
much fluctuations. It might not be unrelated with family income to bear costs for college 
education. Data for Asians are available only for recent years. 
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Figure 9. Total Fall Enrollment by Age
 
 
Figure 9 shows total fall college enrollment by age between 1970 and 2012. Figure 9 
reveals that demand for college education has increased since 1980 among young adults. 
Increased demand for college education might be derived by increased in demand for 
college graduates induced by computer-led industrialization. 
            All five figures (5-9) report that since 1960, the overall trend of college 
enrollment has been increased in race, sex, family income, and age. Parts of increase in 
the college enrollments are likely due to Sputnik-triggered educational reform and 
government programs such as New Frontier and Great Society, while parts of increase in 
the college enrollments are likely due to a shift in demand favoring college graduates by 
skill-biased technological changes. 
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Figure 10. Bachelor’s Degree Conferred by Field of Study 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of college degrees conferred by postsecondary 
institutions from 1970 to 2011. Using data from Digest of Education Statistics 2013, I 
calculated the percentages of some science and engineering related fields of study in 
order to see how many the NSF and the NDEA 1958 produced college students in the 
majors of science and engineering. Unfortunately, there are no data from earlier than 
1970. In 1970 to 1971 academic year, the three most conferred fields of study are 
Education (21%), Social Science and History (18.50%), Business (13.74%). Compared to 
these three fields of study, six fields in Figure 10 are relatively small. Among them, 
biological and biochemical sciences is about 4.24%, engineering is about 5.36%, 
mathematics and statistics is about 2.95%. Because Figure 10 does not show 1950 and 
1960, it is difficult to conjecture how much the NSF and the NDEA 1958 contributed in 
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producing science and engineering related human capitals. Overall, however, the pattern 
of each field of study in Figure 10 shows downward slope. 
 
Figure 11. Tuition and Required Fees ($2012-2013 Constant dollars) 
 
 
Figure 11 shows average undergraduate tuition and fees charged for full-time students in 
degree-granting postsecondary institutions from 1963 to 2011. Private institutions include 
both non-profit and for-profit institutions. Figure 11 reveals that, during the 1970s when 
college enrollments were low, price of tuition was also lower than any other periods. 
Since 1980, however, tuition and fees have been increased for both public institutions and 
private institutions. Especially, tuitions and fees of private institutions are more than 
double the price of public institutions. Increases in tuition and fees are not unrelated to 
the increase in college enrollments. Demand for college education may increase the price 
of tuition and relevant fees. When the federal government extended its educational 
reform from science-oriented education (NSF, NDEA) to general postsecondary 
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education (HEA), it might not have expected soaring college tuition. Therefore, it might 
be an unintended consequence of extending college education. 
 
Figure 12. Percentage of Undergraduates Receiving Federal Financial Aid by Race 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the percentage of undergraduates receiving financial aid from the federal 
government by race11. Black, American Indian, and Hispanic undergraduate students 
have a higher percentage of receiving federal aid relative to Whites, regardless of whether 
it is loan or grant. From the perspective of equality of opportunity to access higher 
education, there seems to be no racial discrimination in federal aid.  
 
  
 
                                                 
11 Asian is undervalued because Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders are excluded. Data are not available for 
early 1960s. 
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Table 3. Average Amount ($) of Federal Financial Aid Awarded to Full-time,                                                  
Full-Year Undergraduates by Race 
 1992 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
  White, non-Hispanic 4297 5549 8659 7318 8040 10760 
  Black, non-Hispanic  4329 5262 8476 7901 8970 11890 
  Hispanic  3666 4644 7084 6670 7370 10190 
  Asian American12 4111 5106 9221 6745 7400 9520 
  American Indian 4047 5046 8343 7463 7650 9980 
 
 Table 3 shows the average amount of financial aid from federal government. It cannot be 
compared across different times because dollar amounts are not converted to constant 
dollars. However, Black and White students receive more aid than other races on average.  
            In summary, the long-term perspective of higher education policy has contributed 
to an increase in college enrollments by all aspects such as sex, race, age, and family 
income. College enrollments of females have outnumbered that of males since 1980. 
College enrollments of students from middle and low income households are much lower 
than students from high income households. However, overall enrollments show an 
upward trend from 1975 to 2013. White students show relatively constant and upward 
trends of enrollments, while enrollment trends of Hispanic and Black students have much 
fluctuations but upward trends overall. Despite emphasizing science-oriented education, 
conferred rates of Bachelor’s degrees of Mathematics, Physical Sciences are very low. 
Engineering and Biological Sciences have relatively higher conferred rates. 
                                                 
12 Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders are excluded. 
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            As an unintended consequence, tuition and required fees of college education 
have been soared up. Especially, tuition of private institutions is much higher than that of 
public institutions. Minorities, such as Black, American Indian, and Hispanic college 
students, have received a higher percentage of federal financial aid than White students. 
It seems there is no racial discrimination for access to federal aid. Average amounts ($) of 
federal financial aid are higher for Black or White students. 
             
            5. Sputnik-Induced Federalism in American Educational System 
 
            Before Sputnik, there had been no national consensus about what kind of 
education and what level of federal involvement was best for the nation. The American 
public was still content with liberal education for the mainstream, while the military was 
trying to define the problem of education as a matter of numbers (Lucena 2005, p.26). 
Sputnik made the question of federal involvement in education more important, however. 
Congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle and the President reached a consensus 
on the importance of science education for the nation’s survival (Lucena 2005, 27). 
Proposals for the federal government’s intervention in education were acceptable as long 
as they would not interfere with the constitutional rights of states and localities (Lucena 
2005, 33).      
            The history of federal government’s involvement in education dates back to the 
1860s. A land-grant university (also called land-grant institution) is an institution of 
higher education in the United States designed by a state to receive the benefits of the 
Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890. The Morrill Acts funded educational institutions by 
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granting federally controlled land to the states for them to sell to raise funds to establish 
and endow "land-grant" colleges. The mission of these institutions as set forth in the 1862 
Act is to focus on the teaching of practical agriculture, science, military science and 
engineering as a response to the industrial revolution and changing social class. 
            The first land-grant bill was introduced in Congress by Representative Justin 
Smith Morrill of Vermont in 1857. A second Morrill Act was passed in 1890, aimed at 
the former Confederate states. This act required each state to show that race was not an 
admissions criterion, or else to designate a separate land-grant institution for persons of 
color. 
           The mission of the land-grant universities was expanded by the Hatch Act of 1887, 
which provided federal funds to states to establish a series of agricultural experiment 
stations under the direction of each state's land-grant college. The outreach mission was 
further expanded by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, which sending of agents into rural 
areas to help bring the results of agricultural research to the end users. 
            The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act was signed into law by President Roosevelt 
on June 22, 1944, commonly known as the G.I. Bill of Rights. The 1944 GI Bill allowed 
returning World War II veterans to continue their education and met twin national goals 
of obligation and economic development (Hannah, 1992). Benefits included low-cost 
mortgages, low-interest loans to start a business, cash payments of tuition and living 
expenses to attend university, high school or vocational education. By 1956, roughly 2.2 
million veterans had used the G.I. Bill education benefits in order to attend colleges or 
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universities, and an additional 5.6 million used these benefits for some kind of training 
program. 
 
Figure 13. Federal R&D Outlays, 1949-2005 ($2000FY)13 
 
 
Figure 13 shows federal outlays for the conduct of research and development from 1940 
to 2007. It includes both national defense and nondefense. Figure 13 shows a dramatic 
change in federal outlays before and after 1957, reflecting impacts of Sputnik. Federal 
outlays hit the peak in 1967 and shows some declines but are an upward overall.  
 
            The National Science Foundation (NSF) was established by the National Science 
Foundation Act of 1950 as an independent federal agency to support fundamental 
research and education in all the non-medical fields of science and engineering. The 
agency’s initial budget was just $151,000 for 9 months. After the event of Sputnik in 
1957, Congress increased the NSF appropriation to $136 million for the 12 months 
                                                 
13 Source: President’s Budget 2007. Fiscal Year 2007. Table 9.7 - Summary of Outlays for the Conduct of 
Research and Development: 1949-2007. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
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beginning July 1, 1958. The NSF’s astronomy program provides all the U.S. federal 
support for ground-based astronomy. In 1960, the NSF’s appropriation was $152.7 
million and 3000 grants were made. 
            The National Defense Educational Act (NDEA) was signed into law on 
September 2, 1958, providing funding to United States education institutions at all levels. 
Especially, it was designed to provide the country with specific defense oriented 
personnel. The act, however, provided financial assistance for thousands of students who 
would be part of the growing numbers enrolling at colleges and universities in the 1960s. 
The act authorized funding for four years, increasing funding per year, and funded on 
eight program titles from $183 million in 1959 to $222 million in 1960. 
 
Figure 14. Expenditure for Education by Federal Government14 
 
Figure 14 shows federal spending on education by educational level. Since 1965, Federal 
spending has increased for elementary and secondary as well as postsecondary education.  
 
                                                 
14 Source: Figure 20 in Chapter 4. Digest of Education Statistics 2013. 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/figures/fig_20.asp?referrer=figures 
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Figure 15. Expenditure for Higher Education 1962-200815 
 
 
Figure 15 shows expenditures for higher education by federal, state, and local 
governments for 1962 to 2008. State and local agencies have historically dominated 
public education, and the traditional task of the Department of Education had been to 
provide assistance and advice to state and local school agencies. In 1965, the Johnson 
administration and Congress were working together, both controlled by the Democratic 
Party. The Higher Education Act of 1965 was passed under President Johnson, along 
with the Economic Opportunity Act, the Elementary and Secondary Schools Act, and the 
Civil Rights Act, which together were intended to eliminate poverty and discrimination 
(Keppel, 1987). The Higher Education Act of 1965 includes eight titles. Especially, Title 
IV assists students by supporting undergraduate scholarships, loans with reduced interest 
rates, and work-study programs. For the fiscal year 1966, HEA 1965 provided total 
authorization for about $1.1 billion for both institutional aid programs and student aid. 
                                                 
15 http://www.usgovernmentspending.com 
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Title IV also requires higher education institutions to be accredited by a federally 
recognized accrediting agency (McGuire, 2012). 
             In the Nixon administration, Pell Grants were established for needy students. The 
War on Poverty tried to help recruit inner-city students for college, and federal civil 
rights agencies and courts threatened white colleges in the South that failed to integrate 
minority students and faculty (Orfield, 1990). Both federal funding and commitment to 
equal education receded in the 1980s, however. The federal government’s share of the 
total college costs peaked in 1979 and decreased in the 1980s. By 1985, federal funds 
were paying just a tenth (10.5 percent) of the costs of public higher education and a sixth 
(16.5 percent) of the costs of private colleges and universities (Orfield, 1990). 
            The 1972 reauthorization of the HEA replaced Educational Opportunity Grants 
(EOGs) with Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG) that were given directly to 
the student. Along with this change, a federal evaluation of need was created that moved 
the assessment of financial need away from institutionally based criteria to a centralized 
federal process to make it more equitable and standardized. The BEOGs were very 
successful, with funding expanding quite rapidly in the early years after their 
introduction, helping to solidify the federal government’s role in ensuring equity in 
postsecondary education access (Gilbert and Heller, 2013). 1972 ushered in a decade of 
Democratic control in Congress and bipartisan support for education in the White House. 
The result was a steady expansion in both eligibility and participation in federal student 
aid programs (Hannah, 1992). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
            This empirical study focuses on wage effects of industry-occupational segregation 
in the labor market. According to Acemoglu’s theory, the pooling and separating 
equilibria, when skilled workers become more abundant, firms find it profitable to design 
jobs for them rather than pool across the two skill groups. A simple relative supply-
demand approach would predict a decline in the relative wages of skilled workers in 
response to increase in supply of skilled workers. In the pooling and separating equilibria, 
however, skilled workers work with higher capital and obtain higher wages in separating 
equilibrium while unskilled workers receive less in separating equilibrium. 
            To measure segregation in the labor market at the state level, I use the Duncan 
Segregation Index for two educational groups: college and higher educated (skilled 
workers), and less than college educated (unskilled workers). Although skill and 
education are not linearly related, educational attainments are best proxy in the census 
data set. 
𝐼 =
1
2
∑ ∑|𝐻𝑖𝑜 − 𝐿𝑖𝑜|,        𝐻𝑖𝑜 ≡
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𝐻𝑖𝑜: Percent of highly educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜 
    ℎ𝑖𝑜: Number of employment of highly educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜 
      ℎ: Total employment of highly educated workers. 
𝐿𝑖𝑜: Percent of less educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜      
      𝑙𝑖0: Number of employment of less educated workers in industry 𝑖 and occupation 𝑜 
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        𝑙: Total employment of less educated workers. 
There is no segregation in any occupation category if Index = 0, while there is complete 
segregation in all occupation categories if Index = 1. In this paper, highly educated 
workers are defined as those with four or more years of college, while less educated 
workers are those with less than four years of college. Moreover, considering that each 
state has different industrial compositions, a formula is used to measure industry-
occupational segregation. To control outliers, industry-occupation cells containing less 
than 10 observations are excluded. This gave a total of 613 cells, containing about 73% 
of total employments in the sample for year 2000 data set. 
 
Figure 16. Concept of Occupational Segregation by Skill Groups 
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Figure 16 is the combined conception of the pooling and separating equilibria with the 
Duncan Segregation Index. Although the Duncan Segregation Index takes absolute value, 
the absolute term on the X-axis is removed for heuristic purpose. Zero on the X-axis 
means complete pooling equilibrium in which firms create only a single type of job for 
both skilled and unskilled workers, and the corresponding wage level is “𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔” 
in the Y-axis. I do not distinguish wage difference between skilled and unskilled workers 
in pooling equilibrium. As skilled workers become abundant, occupations are separated 
for the skilled and for the unskilled. “-1” represents that occupations are completely 
segregated by unskilled workers, while “1” represents that occupations are completely 
segregated by skilled workers. Accordingly, skilled workers obtain higher wages while 
unskilled workers receive lower wages in separating equilibrium. 
            The first empirical concern is the relationship between industry-occupational 
segregation and percentage population with college and higher education. Acemoglu’s 
theory predicts that, as the share of the population with college and higher education 
increases, industry-occupational segregation will increase. The second empirical concern 
is the relationship between job mismatch and industry-occupational segregation. 
Acemoglu’s theory predicts that in separating equilibrium, job mismatch becomes lower 
for both skilled and unskilled workers because jobs are separated and firms spend more 
resources to screen in hiring to find well-matched workers. Searching costs are higher in 
the pooling equilibrium because few skilled workers are available, but searching costs are 
lower in the separating equilibrium because skilled workers are abundant.  
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To measure job mismatch, I use both Duncan-Hoffman and Verdugo-Verdugo 
mismatch measurements because they have a different definition of the required 
education as explained in the literature review. The third empirical concern is interaction 
term between the mismatch variable and the segregation index. It has been proven that 
overeducation itself has a heavy wage penalty. The interaction term will tell us whether 
the wage penalty from overeducation is higher or lower in separating equilibrium. The 
fourth empirical concern is the relative wage of college educated workers to high school 
educated workers. 
1. Summary Statistics
Table 4. Summary Statistics 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Age 39.32 
(10.67) 
38.90 
(11.56) 
37.46 
(11.48) 
37.86 
(10.35) 
39.75 
(10.21) 
Female 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.40 0.42 
Married 0.78 0.77 0.70 0.65 0.62 
Racial Category 
       White 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.87 
       Black 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
       Asian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
       Hispanic 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Educational Category 
       Less than high school 0.45 0.35 0.18 0.09 0.06 
       High school 0.33 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.35 
       Some college 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.33 
       College 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.18 
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       Over college 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 
       Less than college 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.75 
       College and more 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.25 
Experience 22.25 
(11.67) 
21.32 
(12.44) 
18.82 
(12.14) 
18.71 
(10.68) 
20.37 
(10.40) 
Experience-squared 631.26 
(554.66) 
609.27 
(567.13) 
501.62 
(530.39) 
464.24 
(459.52) 
523.24 
(448.31) 
Geographical Category 
       Northeast 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.20 
       Midwest 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.28 
       South 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.36 
       West 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 
       In metro 0.74 0.75 0.83 n.a. 0.79 
Annual Wage ($1999) 30194.88 
(16907.47) 
37130.50 
(23780.01) 
40401.98 
(23750.72) 
39308.56 
(27519.50) 
40538.93 
(27635.39) 
Weekly Wage ($1999) 592.06 
(331.52) 
728.05 
(466.27) 
792.20 
(465.70) 
770.76 
(539.60) 
794.88 
(541.87) 
Hourly Wage ($1999) n.a.
(n.a.)
n.a.
(n.a.)
18.46 
(10.32) 
17.45 
(10.99) 
17.72 
(10.74) 
Occupation Category 
         Managerial 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.16 
         Professional 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 
         Technical 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.33 
         Service 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 
         Precision 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 
         Operator 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.17 
Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch 
         Required education 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.46 
         Over education 0.22 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.34 
         Under education 0.43 0.37 0.23 0.22 0.20 
         Years overeducation 0.58 0.53 0.78 0.62 0.59 
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(1.36) (1.30) (1.47) (1.18) (1.13) 
         Years undereducation -1.45
(2.11)
-1.25
(2.09)
-0.69
(1.55)
-0.62
(1.37)
-0.58
(1.33)
         Years required education 11.95
(1.95)
12.31
(1.30)
12.54
(1.51)
13.15
(1.85)
13.38
(1.97)
Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch 
         VV required education 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 
         VV overeducation 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 
         VV undereducation 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Population (%) by Education 
Level at Residence State 
        Less than high school 0.45 
(0.07) 
0.35 
(0.09) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
        High school 0.33 
(0.04) 
0.39 
(0.05) 
0.43 
(0.05) 
0.37 
(0.06) 
0.34 
(0.06) 
        Some college 0.12 
(0.03) 
0.16 
(0.05) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
0.30 
(0.05) 
0.33 
(0.04) 
        College 0.06 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
        Over college 0.04 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.02) 
        Less than college 0.90 
(0.02) 
0.90 
(0.03) 
0.83 
(0.04) 
0.77 
(0.06) 
0.73 
(0.06) 
        College and more 0.10 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.03) 
0.17 
(0.04) 
0.23 
(0.06) 
0.27 
(0.06) 
Segregation Index 
       National Level 69.90 70.88 60.59 59.45 59.08 
       State Level 46.40 
(7.33) 
47.26 
(6.92) 
41.85 
(6.28) 
42.44 
(5.55) 
44.24 
(5.78) 
The data for this study are random samples from IPUMS-USA one percent of 
1960, 1970, and five percent of 1980, 1990, and 2000. I limited the sample to those who 
are employed or temporarily out of work and between the age 18 and 60, and were born 
in the United States excepting American territories. Geographical analysis includes only 
48 contiguous states. I also excluded all those who are in the agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
armed forces, and public administration industries. To control for outliers, for example in 
case of 2000, I exclude everyone whose hourly wage is less than $5.15 (minimum wage 
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in 2000) or greater than $100, or whose weekly wage is less than $103 (($5.15 * 40 
hours)/2). Workers in the sample are year-round (50 to 52 weeks) full-time workers 
(usually worked more than 35 hours per week). 
            For the mismatch measure, I used the Duncan-Hoffman measure and the 
Verdugo-Verdugo measure. The Duncan-Hoffman mismatch uses the mode years of 
education in each occupation to define required education, so one is categorized as 
overeducated (undereducated) if his or her educational attainment is greater (lower) than 
required years of education. Moreover, the Duncan-Hoffman mismatch measures the 
return to an additional year of schooling beyond required schooling, as well as the return 
to year of underschooling below required schooling. Mismatched workers are compared 
to workers who are in the same occupation holding required schooling.  
            Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch uses mean years of education plus/minus one 
standard deviation in each occupation to define required education. Mismatched workers 
are compared to workers with the same level of schooling who hold adequately matched 
jobs regardless of occupations. Table 4 summary statistics show that the incidence rate of 
the Duncan-Hoffman mismatch is higher than that of the Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch for 
overeducation. It might be because Verdugo-Verdugo required education is higher than 
Duncan-Hoffman required education. Years of required education have been increased, 
which means that college graduates have been increased. The percent (%) population 
with college education by state of residence have been increased, while percent 
population with less than college education have decreased over the period studied. The 
average industry-occupation segregation index has increased for 1980 to 2000 at state 
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level, and the standard deviation has become smaller. Although the segregation index 
does not show a clear trend at the national level for 1980 to 2000, the segregation index at 
the state level reveals that the labor market has been transformed from the pooling 
equilibrium to the separating equilibrium for 1980 to 2000, but the index itself was much 
higher in 1970 and in 1960. Overall, these summary statistics reveals that the proportion 
of population that is college educated, segregation index, and required years education 
have all increased.  
 
Figure 17. Segregation Index vs. Population of College and More Educated   
By State of Residence, 2000 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 shows the relationship between industry-occupational segregation index and 
population with college and higher education based on state of residence for the 48 
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contiguous states in the U.S. The slope of the fitted line tells us that segregation index 
increases 3.77% to a change in 10 percent increase in mean population of high education, 
ceteris paribus. This tells us that states where more of the population has a higher 
education are also more likely to have higher occupational segregation, as Acemoglu’s 
theory predicts.  
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Figure 18. Segregation Index by State (%), 2000 
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Figure 18 shows the rank order of segregation index by the state of residence. Wyoming 
has the lowest index (16.38%), while Pennsylvania has the highest index (51.05%). 
Based on the definition of segregation index, I can interpret the above figure as that the 
job market in Wyoming as a whole state is relatively less segregated between highly 
educated and less educated workers than the job market in the Pennsylvania. In other 
words, the overall job market in Wyoming is a relatively pooling equilibrium, while the 
overall job market in Pennsylvania is a relatively separating equilibrium. Therefore, we 
can expect that returns to schooling, and job mismatch may be different between two 
states.  
 
Figure 19. Overeducation vs. Segregation Index by State of Residence, 2000 
A. Duncan-Hoffman Overeducation
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Overeducation
 
 
Figure 19 shows the relationship between overeducation and segregation index by state of 
residence. Figure A is Duncan-Hoffman overeducation, measured by greater than mode 
year of education in each occupation. Figure B is Verdugo-Verdugo overeducation, 
measured by mean years of education greater than one standard deviation in each 
occupation. Acemoglu’s theory predicts that there will be less overeducations in the 
separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium because overeducated workers 
switch to higher-wage jobs more quickly than others. 
           The pattern of overeducation in the Duncan-Hoffman overeducation is consistent 
with Acemoglu’s theory, showing downward slope as segregation index increases. The 
slope of the fitted line is almost flat in the Verdugo-Verdugo overeducation and 
statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 20. Overeducation vs. College Population by State of Residence, 2000 
 
A. Duncan-Hoffman Overeducation 
 
 
 
B. Verdugo-Verdugo Overeducation 
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Figure 20 shows the relationship between overeducation and population with college and 
higher education by state of residence. Coefficients of both Duncan-Hoffman and 
Verdugo-Verdugo measurements are statistically significant. Especially, Verdugo-
Verdugo measurement shows an almost linear relationship between overeducation and 
population with college and higher education. It appears as that states with more 
population with higher education are more likely to have higher overeducation. 
 
Table 5. Duncan-Hoffman Overeducation by Occupations, 2000 
 Overeducation-Most Overeducation-Least 
1 Transportation ticket and reservation agents Subject instructors (HS/college) 
2 Kindergarten and earlier school teachers Psychologists 
3 Engineering technicians Social scientists 
4 Administrative support jobs Protective services 
5 Insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators Medical scientists 
6 Precision makers, repairers, and smiths Physical scientists 
7 Office supervisors Physicists and astronomers 
8 Managers of properties and real estate Speech therapists 
9 Recreation workers Photographers 
10 Aircraft mechanics Vocational and educational counselors 
11 Chemical technicians Broadcast equipment operators 
12 Library assistants Special education teachers 
13 Supervisors of personal service jobs Buyers, wholesale and retail trade 
14 Computer and peripheral equipment operators Announcers 
15 Surveyors, cartographers, mapping scientists and 
technicians 
Lawyers 
16 Teachers Legal assistants, paralegals, legal support 
17 Construction inspectors Advertising and related sales jobs 
 86 
18 Other science technicians Designers 
19 Customer service reps, investigators and adjusters, 
except insurance 
Police, detectives, and private 
investigators 
20 Material recording, scheduling, production, 
planning, and expediting clerks 
Insurance sales occupations 
 
Table 5 shows the 20 most overeducated occupations and 20 least overeducated 
occupations out of 300 occupations. Overeducation is measured based on Duncan-
Hoffman mode year of education in each occupation. According to Table 5, the 
occupation of ‘Transportation Ticket and Reservation Agents’ is the most overeducated 
occupation, while ‘Subject Instructors (HS/College)’ is the least overeducated occupation 
for year-round full-time U.S. born workers. Overeducation is a relative concept 
geographically. A worker with a required education in a region can be overeducated in a 
different region, even in the same industry-occupation. If there is no physical barrier 
between labor markets, however, workers will migrate to find a well-matched job as long 
as benefit is higher than moving costs. 
 
Table 6. Duncan-Hoffman Undereducation by Occupations, 2000 
 Undereducation-Most Undereducation-Least 
1 Legal assistants, paralegals, legal support Library assistants 
2 Police, detectives, and private investigators Statistical clerks 
3 Art/entertainment performers and related Freight, stock, and materials handlers 
4 Photographers Motion picture projectionists 
5 Broadcast equipment operators Purchasing agents and buyers, of farm 
products 
6 Buyers, wholesale and retail trade Transportation ticket and reservation 
agents 
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7 Vocational and educational counselors Insurance adjusters, examiners, and 
investigators 
8 Insurance sales occupations Power plant operators 
9 Social scientists Interviewers, enumerators, and surveyors 
10 Real estate sales occupations Computer and peripheral equipment 
operators 
11 Salespersons Secretaries 
12 Purchasing managers, agents and buyers Other plant and system operators 
13 Managers in education and related fields Payroll and timekeeping clerks 
14 Management support occupations Administrative support jobs 
15 Designers Bank tellers 
16 Announcers Dental assistants 
17 Physical scientists Typists 
18 Biological technicians Patternmakers and model makers 
19 Managers and administrators Correspondence and order clerks 
20 Insurance underwriters Office supervisors 
 
Table 6 shows the 20 most undereducated occupations and 20 least undereducated 
occupations out of 300 occupations. Undereducation is measured based on Duncan-
Hoffman mode year of education in each occupation. According to the table 6, ‘Legal 
Assistants’ is the most undereducated occupation, while ‘Library Assistants’ is the least 
undereducated occupation for year-round full-time U.S. born workers. 
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            2. Empirical Specification 
            Empirical specification analyzes wage effects of industry-occupational 
segregation and job mismatch. I use a simple OLS wage equation, including segregation 
index, mismatch, and interaction terms. Duncan segregation index applied in this 
regression is the industry-occupational segregation at the state level.  
𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆) =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                   
+  𝜷𝟐(𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+  𝜷𝟒(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+  𝜷𝟓(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
 
Acemoglu’s theory predicts that when skilled workers are abundant, employers react to 
that supply by creating separate jobs for the skilled and the unskilled. Employers make 
investments in capital for the skilled workers to improve productivity and thus to get 
more profits, while depressing wage for unskilled workers. Therefore, as labor markets 
are segregated between skilled and unskilled workers, average wage rate will increase 
more than in the pooling equilibrium. Beta 1 captures the effect of occupational 
segregation on wage rate. Beta 2 and Beta 3 capture wage penalty from mismatch. Their 
sign and magnitude depend on mismatch measurements whether it is Duncan-Hoffman 
mismatch or Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.  
Marginal effects of segregation are measured by the partial derivative 
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𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔 𝟏:  
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
> 𝟎 
Beta 4 and Beta 5 are interaction term between segregation indexes and mismatch 
measurements. The purpose of interaction term is to see how labor market segregation 
effects on wage in the relation with mismatch. In other words, it will tell us whether the 
wage penalty is higher or lower in highly segregated labor market. I hypothesize that 
overall marginal effect of segregation on wage is positive in the full specification. 
             Ζ𝑖 is a vector of covariates including, marital status (married with spouse 
present=1, otherwise=0), four racial dummies (White non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, 
Asian non-Hispanic, Hispanic), five education dummies (High school=0, less than high 
school, some college, college, more than college), labor market experiences (=age-
education-6, experience squared, tripled, quadrupled), four geographical dummies by 
census region (Northeast=0, Midwest, South, West), metropolitan status (in metro=1, 
otherwise=0) and six occupational dummies (precision or operator=0, managerial, 
professional, technical, service based on OCC1990 broad occupation category in the 
IPUMS-USA).  
            Because I use individual level data and the Segregation variable is defined based 
on state, OLS standard errors should not be used because they do not account for intra-
cluster correlation. Therefore, I report standard errors clustered by state. 
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            3. Results 
                   3-1. Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation & Mismatch 
            Regressions were run with three different specifications for only male samples.  
Specification 1: 
             𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆) =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
          Specification 1 includes segregation index with covariates.            
Specification 2: 
            𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
=  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                          
+ 𝜷𝟐(𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
            Specification 2 includes segregation index with covariates and two mismatch 
measurements: Duncan-Hoffman mismatch and Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. 
Specification 3: 
       𝐥𝐧(𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆) =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝟏(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                   
+  𝜷𝟐(𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟑(𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+  𝜷𝟒(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+  𝜷𝟓(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝚽𝒊𝚭𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
             Specification 3 is a full specification, which includes segregation index, 
mismatch, interaction term between mismatch and segregation index, and covariates. 
             Covariates in the each regression are marital status dummy, four racial dummies, 
five education dummies, labor market experiences, four regional dummies, metropolitan 
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status dummy, and six occupational dummies. The dependent variable is log weekly 
wage converted to 1999 constant dollar value. 
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Table 7. Specification (1) for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Segregation Index 0.00165 0.00202 0.00230 0.00576*** 0.00286* 
 (0.00150) (0.00187) (0.00141) (0.00206) (0.00165) 
      
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Mismatch Variables N N N N N 
Observations 108228 114897 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.360 0.390 0.363 0.388 0.377 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males. 
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Table 7 is the regression result of wage effects of industry-occupational segregation by 
regression specification (1). The specification (1) is the simplest specification and 
includes segregation index, covariates but excludes mismatch variables, purposing isolate 
wage effects of segregation from wage effects of job mismatch.  
            Table 7 reveals that average wage rate is higher in states where industry-
occupations are more separated between skilled (college and more educated) and 
unskilled workers (less than college educated). The magnitudes of coefficient are 
increasing up to 1990 and decreased in 2000, but coefficients are statistically significant 
for 2000 and 1990 only.  
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Table 8. Specification (2) for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation 
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Segregation Index 
0.00158 0.00192 0.00228 0.00574*** 0.00282* 
(0.00140) (0.00184) (0.00140) (0.00206) (0.00164) 
      
Years of Over education 
0.04419*** 0.04321*** 0.02376*** 0.02629*** 0.01293*** 
(0.00301) (0.00276) (0.00154) (0.00138) (0.00119) 
Years of Under education 
-0.03653*** -0.02664*** -0.02679*** -0.03041*** -0.02884*** 
(0.00248) (0.00214) (0.00149) (0.00125) (0.00116) 
Years of Required education 
0.04710*** 0.02126*** 0.02166*** 0.07381*** 0.07206*** 
(0.00293) (0.00465) (0.00344) (0.00204) (0.00145) 
      
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 114897 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.373 0.396 0.366 0.395 0.388 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males. 
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Segregation Index 
0.00165 0.00201 0.00230 0.00576*** 0.00285* 
(0.00150) (0.00187) (0.00141) (0.00206) (0.00164) 
      
Over education 
-0.02581*** -0.00883 -0.01995*** -0.05812*** -0.06606*** 
(0.00566) (0.00583) (0.00484) (0.00534) (0.00637) 
Under education 
-0.03729*** -0.01635* -0.02302*** 0.03694*** 0.07127*** 
(0.01354) (0.00892) (0.00542) (0.00522) (0.00604) 
      
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 114897 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.361 0.390 0.364 0.389 0.378  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males. 
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Table 8 is the regression result for wage effects of industry-occupational segregation by 
regression specification (2). The specification (2) includes segregation index, covariates 
and two mismatch measures.  
            Table A is the regression result with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, while Table B 
is the regression result with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. Coefficient of segregation has 
positive wage effects in both Table A and Table B, but the magnitudes are a little bit 
smaller with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch and almost same with Verdugo-Verdugo 
mismatch. 
            In Table A, Duncan-Hoffman years of overeducation measures the returns to 
additional year of education beyond the required educational attainment, while years of 
undereducation measures the returns to additional year of education below the required 
educational attainment. Table A says that the coefficient of overeducation is positive but 
smaller than that of required education, which is called the wage penalty. In other words, 
returns to additional year of education beyond the required education are positive but 
much smaller than that of required education (0.01293 < 0.07206, in 2000), while returns 
to additional year of education below the required education are negative (-0.02884 < 
0.07206, in 2000). It is natural in the sense that additional years of overeducation beyond 
required education are unproductive; therefore, returns are positive, but smaller than 
those who have required education.  
            The coefficient of required education has been increased since 1970, which means 
that returns to years of required education have been substantially increased. The 
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coefficient of overeducation has been decreased since 1960, which means that wage 
penalty for holding an additional year of education has been substantially increased. 
            Table B is the regression result with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. Overeducation 
and undereducation are dummy variables in the Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. In Table B, 
the coefficient of overeducation is negative (which is called wage penalty) and the 
coefficient of undereducation is positive (which is called substantial wage premium), 
which is consistent with empirical findings from previous literatures. It tells us that, 
relative to workers who have required education, wage penalty related with 
overeducation is substantially higher. The coefficient of undereducation is positive only 
in 1990, 2000, which there are wage premiums related with undereducation. Absolute 
value of coefficient of overeducation has been increased since 1970, which means that 
wage penalty from overeducation has been substantially increased.  
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Table 9. Specification (3) for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation. 
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Segregation Index 
-0.00428 -0.01073* -0.00973* -0.00544 -0.00707* 
(0.00310) (0.00633) (0.00518) (0.00434) (0.00398) 
      
                        Years of Over education 
0.04134*** 0.00392 -0.00754 -0.02808*** -0.02654** 
(0.01402) (0.02080) (0.01037) (0.01037) (0.01045) 
Segregation*Years of Over education 0.00006 0.00081* 0.00075*** 0.00129*** 0.00089*** 
 (0.00031) (0.00042) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00023) 
                        Years of Under education 
-0.05459*** -0.04710*** -0.04269*** -0.03089*** -0.02323*** 
(0.01106) (0.01356) (0.00933) (0.01054) (0.00757) 
Segregation*Years of Under education 0.00039 0.00043 0.00038* 0.00001 -0.00013 
 (0.00025) (0.00029) (0.00022) (0.00025) (0.00017) 
                        Years of Required education 
0.02639** -0.02441 -0.01579 0.04047*** 0.04048*** 
(0.01181) (0.02544) (0.01568) (0.01437) (0.01486) 
Segregation*Years of Required education 0.00043* 0.00094* 0.00089** 0.00079** 0.00071** 
(0.00025) (0.00054) (0.00041) (0.00035) (0.00034) 
      
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 114897 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.374 0.396 0.367 0.395 0.388 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males. 
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Segregation Index 
0.00139 0.00136 0.00186 0.00527** 0.00257 
(0.00147) (0.00192) (0.00137) (0.00207) (0.00158) 
      
                         Over education 
0.01104 -0.14526** -0.10890*** -0.19196*** -0.16617*** 
(0.03427) (0.06353) (0.02821) (0.02540) (0.02959) 
Segregation* Over education -0.00078 0.00282** 0.00212*** 0.00316*** 0.00225*** 
 (0.00072) (0.00128) (0.00066) (0.00062) (0.00060) 
                         Under education 
-0.17183** -0.14712* -0.07905* 0.01941  0.09164*** 
(0.07753) (0.07449) (0.04116) (0.04016) (0.02745) 
Segregation* Under education 
0.00285* 0.00272* 0.00133 0.00041 -0.00045 
(0.00168) (0.00156) (0.00096) (0.00093) (0.00060) 
      
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 114897 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.361 0.390 0.364 0.389 0.378  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males. 
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Table 9 is the regression result of wage effects of industry-occupational segregation by 
regression specification (3), which is a full specification, including segregation index, 
covariates, mismatch measures, and interaction term between mismatch and segregation 
index. The purpose of interaction term is purpose to see the wage effects of mismatch in 
relation with segregation. Table A is with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, and Table B is 
with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. 
            Marginal effect of segregation from Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch for 2000 is 
expressed as follows with coefficients from Table A. 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟗(𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
− 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟑(𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
+ 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟏(𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
With the mean value of years of overeducation, years of undereducation, and years of 
required education from the summary statistics table, marginal effect of segregation is 
calculated as follows 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟗(𝟎. 𝟓𝟗) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟑(−𝟎. 𝟓𝟖) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟏(𝟏𝟑. 𝟑𝟖)
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟑𝟏 > 𝟎 
I can see the positive effect of segregation and it can be interpreted as a partial elasticity. 
Weekly wage will increase 0.31% to one unit increase in segregation index at the mean.  
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           The wage effects of years of overeducation, years of undereducation, and years of 
required education in the relation with segregation for 2000 can be calculated as follows, 
respectively 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟔𝟓𝟒 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟖𝟗(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟑𝟐𝟑 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟑(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒚𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒔 𝒐𝒇 𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  𝟎. 𝟎𝟒𝟎𝟒𝟖 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟏(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
 
It tells us that first, returns to years of education is higher for those who have required 
education and followed by for those who have overeducation. The second finding is that 
returns to additional years of overeducation beyond (below) the required education are 
decreasing but such wage penalty becomes smaller (larger) in the state where industry-
occupations are more separated between the skilled and the unskilled. In other words, 
wage penalty related with overeducation is substantially higher but it becomes smaller in 
the states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the 
unskilled. As Acemoglu’s theory predicts, skilled workers earn more and unskilled 
workers earn less in the separating equilibrium because overeducation is a matter to the 
skilled workers generally. 
 
            Marginal effects of segregation from Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch for 2000 is as 
follows: 
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𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟓𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐𝟓(𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟒𝟓(𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)  
 
 Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch is dummy variable with using required education as a 
reference category. Therefore, in the above marginal effects of segregation, 
overeducation and undereducation cannot be equal to 1 at the same time. Marginal effects 
of segregation is 0.00482 if overeducation=1, while it is 0.00212 if undereducation=1. In 
either case, marginal effects of segregation are positive. 
            The wage effects of overeducation and undereducation in the relation with 
segregation for 2000 can be calculated as follows, respectively. 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟏𝟔𝟔𝟏𝟕 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟐𝟓(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏),   𝒊𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  𝟎. 𝟎𝟗𝟏𝟔𝟒 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟒𝟓(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏),   𝒊𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏 
The wage effects of overeducation (undereducation) reveal that workers who are 
overeducated (undereducated) obtain less (more) than workers who have required 
education, but such wage penalty (wage premium) becomes smaller in the states where 
industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the unskilled (second 
term of right hand side). Therefore, skilled workers earn more and unskilled workers earn 
less in the separating equilibrium. 
            In summary, three regression specifications examine the wage effects of industry-
occupational segregation and the wage effects of mismatch, and wage effects of 
mismatch in the relation with industry-occupational segregation. The first finding is that 
wage effects of industry-occupational segregation are positive. The second finding is that 
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the wage penalty related with overeducation is substantially high for all study periods. In 
fact, the pattern of wage penalty has been increased over time. The third finding is that 
the wage penalty from overeducation becomes smaller in states where industry-
occupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers. The fourth 
finding that differs from those of previous studies is about wage effects of mismatch in 
the relation with segregation because previous studies did not consider that the labor 
market can transform from a pooling equilibrium to a separating equilibrium, and 
accordingly, the wage penalty from overeducation also can be different in the pooling 
equilibrium and in the separating equilibrium.  
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Table 10. Alternative Specification for Wage Effects of Industry-Occupational Segregation. 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Segregation Index 
0.00103 0.00086 0.00129 0.00431* 0.00199  
(0.00153) (0.00198) (0.00133) (0.00221) (0.00169) 
      
                     Over education 
0.06623 -0.06645 -0.09081*** -0.23519*** -0.23016*** 
(0.04376) (0.06703) (0.02854) (0.02683) (0.01784) 
Segregation*Over education -0.00080 0.00250* 0.00188*** 0.00330*** 0.00192*** 
 (0.00092) (0.00138) (0.00064) (0.00068) (0.00039) 
                     Under education 
-0.03630 -0.01683 -0.11114*** -0.05449* -0.01858 
(0.05028) (0.06392) (0.03157) (0.02926) (0.02033) 
Segregation*Under education 
0.00175 0.00158 0.00175** 0.00171** 0.00093** 
(0.00104) (0.00122) (0.00075) (0.00070) (0.00044) 
      
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228  114897 636312  822145  847385  
R-squared 0.361 0.391 0.364 0.390 0.383 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males. 
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In Table 10, both overeducation and undereducation are simple dummy variables from 
Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, instead of measuring how many additional years of 
education are overeducated or undereducated than the required education. If workers’ 
educational attainments are higher (lower) than the mode year of education in occupation, 
they are classified to overeducation (undereducation). 
            Marginal effects of segregation for 2000 is expressed as follow 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
= 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟗 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟐(𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟑(𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)  
 
Required education is a reference category. Therefore, in the above marginal effects of 
segregation, overeducation and undereducation cannot be equal to 1 at the same time. 
Either of case, however, marginal effects of segregation is positive. 
           The wage effects of overeducation and undereducation in the relation with 
segregation for 2000 can be calculated as follows, respectively: 
 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟐𝟑𝟎𝟏𝟔 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟐(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏),   𝒊𝒇 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
=  −𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟖𝟓𝟖 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟑(𝒔𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏),   𝒊𝒇 𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝟏 
 
           Wage penalty for both overeducation and undereducation is substantially large but 
it becomes smaller in states where industry-occupations are more separated between 
skilled and unskilled workers. I can find the same results that marginal effects of 
segregation is positive and wage penalty related with overeducation becomes smaller in 
 106 
the states where industry-occupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled 
workers. 
 
             3-2. College Wage Premiums 
 
            This section examines changes in the college wage premium over time, using five 
educational categories and use high school graduates as a reference category. Following 
is the regression specification. 
 
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊)
+ 𝜷𝟐(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                                                                                                     
+ 𝜷3(𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆 ∗ 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                                                                  
+ 𝜷𝟒(𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷5(𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜱𝒊𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
 
𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔: 𝜷𝟑 > 𝟎 
 
            Relative college wage premiums are higher in states where industry-occupations 
are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers as Acemoglu’s theory predicts. 
Marginal effects of college in the relation with segregation are measured by the partial 
derivative as follows: 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆
=  𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
            Regressions were run with three different specifications for only male samples.  
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Specification (1): 
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆) = 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊) + 𝜱𝒊𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
         Specification (1) includes educational dummies and covariates. 
Specification (2): 
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊)
+ 𝜷𝟐(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                                                                                                     
+ 𝜷𝟑(𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜱𝒊𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
            Specification (2) includes educational dummies, industry-occupational 
segregation index, mismatch variables, and covariates. 
Specification (3): 
𝒍𝒏(𝑾𝒂𝒈𝒆)
= 𝜶𝟏 + 𝜷𝟏(𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒊)
+ 𝜷𝟐(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                                                                                                     
+ 𝜷𝟑(𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆 ∗ 𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜷𝟒(𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)                                                       
+ 𝜷𝟓(𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝜱𝒊𝜡𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 
 
            Specification (3) is a full specification which includes educational dummies, 
industry-occupational segregation index, mismatch variables, interaction term between 
college and segregation index, and covariates. The purpose of the interaction term is to 
see college wage premiums in the relation with industry-occupational segregation. 
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Table 11. Specification (1) for College Wage Premiums 
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
College 0.27396*** 0.32963*** 0.28433*** 0.40537*** 0.38542*** 
(0.01053) (0.01313) (0.00761) (0.00767) (0.00765) 
Less than High School -0.13525*** -0.17021*** -0.14393*** -0.17838*** -0.15442***
(0.00831) (0.00760) (0.00637) (0.00743) (0.00455)
Some College 0.09613*** 0.07319*** 0.09247*** 0.13699*** 0.12345*** 
(0.00585) (0.00698) (0.00388) (0.00534) (0.00328) 
Over College 0.28697*** 0.40125*** 0.38781*** 0.56637*** 0.53022*** 
(0.01229) (0.02302) (0.01227) (0.00924) (0.00833) 
Segregation Index N N N N N 
Mismatch Variables N N N N N 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 117081 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.360 0.333 0.363 0.385 0.376 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 11 shows the regression results for college wage premiums by regression 
specification (1), which includes covariates. The purpose of the specification (1) is to 
isolate wage effects of college education from wage effects of job mismatch. Relative to 
high school graduates, wage rate for college graduates shows variations over time. It 
might reflect changes in the supply of and demand for college graduates. For 1990, 
weekly college wage is about 50% ({exp(0.40537)-1}*100=49.99) higher than high 
school graduates. Overall, college wage premiums are higher in 2000, 1990 than other 
periods. 
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Table 12. Specification (2) for College Wage Premiums 
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
College 0.11343*** 0.16949*** 0.19401*** 0.27838*** 0.27785*** 
(0.01047) (0.01425) (0.00692) (0.00872) (0.00893) 
Less than High School 
-0.02050*** -0.07323*** -0.07158*** -0.10516*** -0.08793***
(0.00446) (0.00547) (0.00378) (0.00613) (0.00489)
Some College 
0.03007*** 0.00624 0.05490*** 0.09952*** 0.10343*** 
(0.00381) (0.00667) (0.00342) (0.00520) (0.00340) 
Over College 
0.00784 0.13766*** 0.25331*** 0.36210*** 0.35866*** 
(0.01160) (0.02479) (0.00932) (0.01167) (0.01082) 
Segregation Index 
0.00158 0.00213 0.00228 0.00574*** 0.00574*** 
(0.00140) (0.00180) (0.00140) (0.00206) (0.00206) 
Mismatch Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 117081 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.373 0.340 0.366 0.395 0.388 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
College 0.28615*** 0.32971*** 0.29272*** 0.44720*** 0.44156*** 
(0.01059) (0.01410) (0.00854) (0.00768) (0.01092) 
Less than High School 
-0.13468*** -0.16101*** -0.13451*** -0.20140*** -0.19904***
(0.00638) (0.00595) (0.00544) (0.00568) (0.00511)
Some College 
0.09894*** 0.07354*** 0.09623*** 0.14701*** 0.13994*** 
(0.00531) (0.00725) (0.00389) (0.00550) (0.00340) 
Over College 
0.30082*** 0.40221*** 0.40278*** 0.63034*** 0.61282*** 
(0.01107) (0.02462) (0.01470) (0.01150) (0.01368) 
Segregation Index 
0.00165 0.00224 0.00230 0.00576*** 0.00285* 
(0.00150) (0.00184) (0.00141) (0.00206) (0.00164) 
Mismatch Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 117081 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.361 0.334 0.364 0.389 0.378 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 12 shows the regression results for college wage premiums by regression 
specification (2), which includes covariates, industry-occupational segregation index, and 
mismatch variables. Table A is regression with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, while Table 
B is regression with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch.  
In Table A with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, coefficients of college are much 
smaller than in the Table 11, which has with no mismatch. Coefficients of college have 
been increased with Duncan-Hoffman mismatch. In other words, relative college wage 
premiums have been increased. 
In Table B with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch, coefficients of college are much 
larger than in the Table 11, which has no mismatch. Coefficients of college have been 
varied very much over time. No constant pattern can be found.  
Overall, college wage premiums are affected with or without mismatch variables, 
reflecting overeducation is mostly a matter for college graduates. 
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Table 13. Specification (3) for College Wage Premiums 
A. Duncan-Hoffman Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
College 
0.10632 0.07820 0.11913** 0.15725*** 0.17345*** 
(0.07040) (0.09763) (0.04507) (0.04031) (0.05549) 
College*Segregation 0.00015 0.00187 0.00176 0.00284*** 0.00234*  
(0.00139) (0.00207) (0.00108) (0.00095) (0.00129) 
Less than High School -0.02049*** -0.07318*** -0.07165*** -0.10528*** -0.08809***
(0.00445) (0.00546) (0.00378) (0.00611) (0.00487)
Some College 
0.03006*** 0.00608 0.05458*** 0.09938*** 0.10327*** 
(0.00382) (0.00659) (0.00342) (0.00516) (0.00342) 
Over College 
0.00779 0.13728*** 0.25262*** 0.36177*** 0.35852*** 
(0.01181) (0.02461) (0.00926) (0.01164) (0.01080) 
Segregation Index 
0.00157 0.00199 0.00207 0.00528** 0.00241 
(0.00140) (0.00179) (0.00137) (0.00204) (0.00153) 
Mismatch Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 117081 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.373 0.340 0.366 0.395 0.388 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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B. Verdugo-Verdugo Mismatch
Dependent Variable is Log Weekly Wage ($1999) 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
College 
0.30712*** 0.25964*** 0.22362*** 0.33174*** 0.32825*** 
(0.07098) (0.09417) (0.04402) (0.04100) (0.05625) 
College*Segregation 
-0.00044 0.00144 0.00164 0.00271*** 0.00254*  
(0.00147) (0.00203) (0.00109) (0.00098) (0.00138) 
Less than High School -0.13469*** -0.16100*** -0.13457*** -0.20151*** -0.19918***
(0.00637) (0.00595) (0.00545) (0.00566) (0.00511)
Some College 
0.09894*** 0.07354*** 0.09619*** 0.14698*** 0.13987*** 
(0.00532) (0.00722) (0.00387) (0.00544) (0.00342) 
Over College 
0.30087*** 0.40233*** 0.40285*** 0.63017*** 0.61275*** 
(0.01107) (0.02469) (0.01471) (0.01146) (0.01367) 
Segregation Index 
0.00168 0.00213 0.00210 0.0532** 0.00241 
(0.00150) (0.00182) (0.00138) (0.00204) (0.00152) 
Mismatch Variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 108228 117081 636312 822145 847385 
R-squared 0.361 0.334 0.364 0.389 0.378 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Regression is for males.
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Table 13 shows the regression results for college wage premiums by regression 
specification (3), which is a full specification. Table A is regression with Duncan-
Hoffman mismatch, while Table B is regression with Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch. 
Wage effects of college education are measured as follows for 2000 with Duncan-
Hoffman mismatch and Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch, respectively: 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆
=  𝟎. 𝟏𝟕𝟑𝟒𝟓 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟑𝟒(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
𝝏 𝐥𝐧 (𝒘𝒂𝒈𝒆)
𝝏 𝑪𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒆
=  𝟎. 𝟑𝟐𝟖𝟐𝟓 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟓𝟒(𝑺𝒆𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒈𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) 
With controlling Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, the coefficient of college is much smaller 
than the coefficient of controlling Verdugo-Verdugo mismatch, but the magnitudes of 
coefficient of interaction term are almost the same. The coefficient of interaction term tells 
us that college wage premiums increase in the states where industry-occupations are more 
separated between the skilled and the unskilled. In other words, skilled workers earn more 
wages in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium. 
   In summary, relative to high school graduates, college wage premiums have 
fluctuated over time, reflecting changes in the supply of and demand for college 
graduates in the labor markets. The interaction term between the college dummy variable 
and segregation index reveals that college graduates earn more in states where industry-
occupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers. In other words, 
skilled workers earn more wages in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling 
equilibrium.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
This paper began with analyzing a cause and effect relationship between the 
Soviet launch of Sputnik and educational reform in the early 1960s in the United States. 
During the Cold War, the Soviet launching of Sputnik poured fuel onto an existing arms 
race between the Soviets and America. The American public and government perceived 
Sputnik to be more a military threat than a simple product of science education. President 
Eisenhower, however, found that they had a shortfall in scientists and had a lack of 
science education to compete with USSR. Therefore, educational reform was arose 
immediately. First, the American government extended the role of the existing National 
Science Foundation in science education and production of science elites. Second, 
Eisenhower signed into law the National Defense of Education Act on September 2, 
1958, which was less than a year after the launching of Sputnik 1. Congress authorized 
budgets for NSF and NDEA to produce science and defense related human capitals. The 
NDEA poured $887 million over four years into programs intended to develop talented 
people in America in fields related with national defense by providing scholarships to 
students. During the Eisenhower administration, the goal of federal funding was 
producing scientists and engineers for the national security.  
After Eisenhower, Kennedy became the President. His domestic agendas, under 
the name of the New Frontier, were racial integration, equality of the sex in the work 
place, civil rights of African American, and extending equal opportunity of access to 
higher education by minority races. After Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson 
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became the President. Johnson was interested in civil rights, eliminating poverty, and 
racial injustice under his domestic program, Great Society. The Higher Education Act 
was signed into law in 1965, and was one of the fruits of Great Society. Sputnik-triggered 
educational reform was transformed from science and defense education to production of 
more general human capitals for economic growth. 
     From the NSF, NDEA to HEA, the federal goal of educational reform was 
diffused from science and defense education to all levels of education to provide 
Americans more educational opportunities and to produce general human capitals for 
economic growth. By combining three policy outputs, NSF, NDEA, HEA, and the 
increase in college enrollments as a policy outcome, empirical study analyzed wage 
effects of increase in the supply of college graduates by applying Acemoglu’s theory, the 
pooling equilibrium and the separating equilibrium. In applying Acemoglu’s theory, I 
calculated industry-occupational segregation index by using Duncan segregation index 
for the contiguous 48 states over the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 using 
decennial census data from IPUMS-USA. 
 Empirical study found first that, as the portion of population educated with 
college or higher increases, industry-occupational segregation increases, which is 
consistent with Acemoglu’s theory that as skilled workers are abundant, the economy 
transforms from the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium. The second 
finding is that incidence of overeducation, measured by Duncan-Hoffman mismatch, 
decreases as segregation index increases. In other words, the probability of being 
overeducated becomes lower in states where industry-occupations are more separated 
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between skilled and unskilled workers. The third finding is that wage effects of 
segregation are positive and largest in 1990. In other words, mean wage is higher in states 
where industry-occupations are more separated between skilled and unskilled workers. 
The fourth finding is that marginal effect of segregation, including interaction term 
between segregation and mismatch variables, on wage is positive with Duncan-Hoffman 
mismatch. The fifth finding is that returns to additional years of overeducation beyond 
the required education are decreasing but such wage penalty becomes smaller in the 
states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the 
unskilled. In other words, wage penalty related with overeducation is substantially higher 
but it becomes smaller in the separating equilibrium. Analyzing wage effects of 
overeducation in the relation with the pooling and separating equilibria is a different 
approach from previous literatures. 
Moreover, college wage premium in the relation with the pooling and separating 
equilibria shows that, relative to high school graduates, college graduates earn more 
wages in states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and 
the unskilled. 
       In summary, this paper insists that educational reform in the early 1960s did not 
arise by domestic needs but it was triggered by an exogenous event: the Soviet launching 
of Sputnik. The Sputnik-triggered educational reform contributed increases in college 
enrollments and thereby increases in the supply of college graduates over time. Policy 
process reveals how reactions of the American public, media, politicians, national mood, 
and President attributed to educational reform. As unintended consequences, tuition and 
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fees of college education have soared up, corresponding to the increase in demand for 
college education. Another unintended consequence is the involvement of the federal 
government in education. The role of federal government in the educational reform did 
not stop with NDEA 1958, but was much extended under President Kennedy’s New 
Frontier and President Johnson’s Great Society. By applying Acemoglu’s theory in 
empirical study, I can partially confirm that labor markets at the state level have 
transformed from the pooling equilibrium to the separating equilibrium since 1960 to 
2000. In such a transition, skilled workers obtain more wages than unskilled workers in 
the states where industry-occupations are more separated between the skilled and the 
unskilled. Related with overeducation, wage penalty is substantially higher but it 
becomes smaller in the states where industry-occupations are more separated between the 
skilled and the unskilled. In other words, as the economy transforms to the separating 
equilibrium, wage inequality between the skilled and the unskilled becomes wider and 
wage penalty from overeducation (a matter exclusive to the skilled workers) becomes 
smaller.  
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